linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 5/5] vfio-pci: Allow to mmap MSI-X table if interrupt remapping is supported

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Date:	Tue, 3 May 2016 15:34:11 +0800
From:	Yongji Xie <xyjxie@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	"Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@...el.com>,
	"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-pci@...r.kernel.org" <linux-pci@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>,
	"iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
Cc:	"alex.williamson@...hat.com" <alex.williamson@...hat.com>,
	"bhelgaas@...gle.com" <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
	"aik@...abs.ru" <aik@...abs.ru>,
	"benh@...nel.crashing.org" <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
	"paulus@...ba.org" <paulus@...ba.org>,
	"mpe@...erman.id.au" <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
	"joro@...tes.org" <joro@...tes.org>,
	"warrier@...ux.vnet.ibm.com" <warrier@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"zhong@...ux.vnet.ibm.com" <zhong@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"nikunj@...ux.vnet.ibm.com" <nikunj@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"eric.auger@...aro.org" <eric.auger@...aro.org>,
	"will.deacon@....com" <will.deacon@....com>,
	"gwshan@...ux.vnet.ibm.com" <gwshan@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"David.Laight@...LAB.COM" <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>,
	"alistair@...ple.id.au" <alistair@...ple.id.au>,
	"ruscur@...sell.cc" <ruscur@...sell.cc>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] vfio-pci: Allow to mmap MSI-X table if interrupt
 remapping is supported

On 2016/5/3 14:22, Tian, Kevin wrote:

>> From: Yongji Xie [mailto:xyjxie@...ux.vnet.ibm.com]
>> Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2016 2:08 PM
>>
>> On 2016/5/3 13:34, Tian, Kevin wrote:
>>
>>>> From: Yongji Xie
>>>> Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2016 8:43 PM
>>>>
>>>> This patch enables mmapping MSI-X tables if hardware supports
>>>> interrupt remapping which can ensure that a given pci device
>>>> can only shoot the MSIs assigned for it.
>>>>
>>>> With MSI-X table mmapped, we also need to expose the
>>>> read/write interface which will be used to access MSI-X table.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Yongji Xie <xyjxie@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>> A curious question here. Does "allow to mmap MSI-X" essentially
>>> mean that KVM guest can directly read/write physical MSI-X
>>> structure then?
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>> Kevin
>>>
>> Here we just allow to mmap MSI-X table in kernel. It doesn't
>> mean all KVM guest can directly read/write physical MSI-X
>> structure. This should be decided by QEMU. For PPC64
>> platform, we would allow to passthrough the MSI-X table
>> because we know guest kernel would not write physical
>> MSI-X structure when enabling MSI.
>>
> A bit confused here. If guest kernel doesn't need to write
> physical MSI-X structure, what's the point of passing through
> the table then?

We want to allow the MSI-X table because there may be
some critical registers in the same page as the MSI-X table.
We have to handle the mmio access to these register in QEMU
rather than in guest if mmapping MSI-X table is disallowed.

> I think the key whether MSI-X table can be passed through
> is related to where hypervisor control is deployed. At least
> for x86:
>
> - When irq remapping is not enabled, host/hypervisor needs
> to control physical interrupt message including vector/dest/etc.
> directly in MSI-X structure, so we cannot allow a guest to
> access it;
>
> - when irq remapping is enabled, host/hypervisor can control
> interrupt routing in irq remapping table. However MSI-X
> also needs to be configured as remappable format. In this
> manner we also cannot allow direct access from guest.
>
> The only sane case to pass through MSI-X structure, is a
> mechanism similar to irq remapping but w/o need to change
> original MSI-X format so direct access from guest side is
> safe. Is it the case in PPC64?
>
> Thanks
> Kevin

Acutually, we are not aimed at accessing MSI-X table from
guest. So I think it's safe to passthrough MSI-X table if we
can make sure guest kernel would not touch MSI-X table in
normal code path such as para-virtualized guest kernel on PPC64.

Thanks,
Yongji