linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] [RFC] x86: work around MPX Erratum

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CALCETrVUSkzmTFv3Ljsrrb8FA-_yGc7OkP+f0ijTNBydEcEGyw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Fri, 6 May 2016 12:01:06 -0700
From:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc:	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] x86: work around MPX Erratum

On Thu, May 5, 2016 at 11:40 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> * Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 11:44 PM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > * Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>> >
>> >> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 2:43 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>> >> > On 05/03/2016 02:31 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >> >> Having actually read the erratum: how can this affect Linux at all
>> >> >> under any scenario where user code hasn't already completely
>> >> >> compromised the kernel?
>> >> >>
>> >> >> I.e. why do we care about this erratum?
>> >> >
>> >> > First of all, with SMEP, it doesn't affect us.  At all.
>> >> >
>> >> > Without SMEP, there would have to be a page accessible to userspace that the
>> >> > kernel executes instructions from.  The only thing that I can think of that's
>> >> > normally user-accessible and not _controlled_ by userspace is the VDSO.  But
>> >> > the kernel never actually executes from it, so it doesn't matter here.
>> >> >
>> >> > I've heard reports of (but no actual cases in the wild of) folks remapping
>> >> > kernel text to be user-accessible so that userspace can execute it, or of
>> >> > having the kernel jump into user-provided libraries. Those are both obviously
>> >> > bonkers and would only be done with out-of-tree gunk, but even if somebody did
>> >> > that, they would be safe from the erratum, with this workaround.
>> >>
>> >> I'm not convinced this is worth adding any code for, though.  If someone adds
>> >> out of tree crap that does this and manually turns off SMEP, I think they should
>> >> get to keep both pieces.  Frankly, I think I'd *prefer* if the kernel crashed
>> >> when calling user addresses like that just to discourage it.
>> >
>> > So the thing is, this doesn't have to be any (or much) code per se: my suggestion
>> > was to make MPX depend on SMEP on the Kconfig level, so that it's not possible to
>> > build MPX without having SMEP.
>>
>> I don't think I understand that suggestion.  How can Kconfig protect against:
>>
>> qemu -cpu host,-smep
>>
>> ?
>
> Right, it cannot - but I think the latest patch was pretty close and pretty
> simple.

No objections from me for that patch.

>
> Thanks,
>
>         Ingo



-- 
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC