linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v8 7/7] mm: kasan: Initial memory quarantine implementation

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Message-ID: <CAPAsAGyxo9vHUM63tEKBS_edmYSHkxXhX-zrzaKP4QG4Vbf3FA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Tue, 10 May 2016 22:57:37 +0300
From:	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
To:	Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Cc:	Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@...il.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <js1304@...il.com>,
	Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 7/7] mm: kasan: Initial memory quarantine implementation

2016-05-10 20:17 GMT+03:00 Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>:
> On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 5:39 PM, Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com> wrote:
>> 2016-03-15 13:10 GMT+03:00 Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>:
>>
>>>
>>>  static inline int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size) { return 0; }
>>>  static inline void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm) {}
>>> diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c
>>> index 82169fb..799c98e 100644
>>> --- a/lib/test_kasan.c
>>> +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
>>> @@ -344,6 +344,32 @@ static noinline void __init kasan_stack_oob(void)
>>>         *(volatile char *)p;
>>>  }
>>>
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
>>> +static noinline void __init kasan_quarantine_cache(void)
>>> +{
>>> +       struct kmem_cache *cache = kmem_cache_create(
>>> +                       "test", 137, 8, GFP_KERNEL, NULL);
>>> +       int i;
>>> +
>>> +       for (i = 0; i <  100; i++) {
>>> +               void *p = kmem_cache_alloc(cache, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> +
>>> +               kmem_cache_free(cache, p);
>>> +               p = kmalloc(sizeof(u64), GFP_KERNEL);
>>> +               kfree(p);
>>> +       }
>>> +       kmem_cache_shrink(cache);
>>> +       for (i = 0; i <  100; i++) {
>>> +               u64 *p = kmem_cache_alloc(cache, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> +
>>> +               kmem_cache_free(cache, p);
>>> +               p = kmalloc(sizeof(u64), GFP_KERNEL);
>>> +               kfree(p);
>>> +       }
>>> +       kmem_cache_destroy(cache);
>>> +}
>>> +#endif
>>> +
>>
>> Test looks quite useless. The kernel does allocations/frees all the
>> time, so I don't think that this test
>> adds something valuable.
> Agreed.
>> And what's the result that we expect from this test? No crashes?
>> I'm thinking it would better to remove it.
> Do you think it may make sense to improve it by introducing an actual
> use-after-free?
> Or perhaps we could insert a loop doing 1000 kmalloc()/kfree() calls
> into the existing UAF tests.

You don't need to do an actual UAF, all you need is to
make sure that repeated  kmalloc() + kfree() produces new addresses.

But I personally wouldn't bother with testing this at all.  So, unless
you care, just remove the test.

>>
>>> +
>>> +/* smp_load_acquire() here pairs with smp_store_release() in
>>> + * quarantine_reduce().
>>> + */
>>> +#define QUARANTINE_LOW_SIZE (smp_load_acquire(&quarantine_size) * 3 / 4)
>>
>> I'd prefer open coding barrier with a proper comment int place,
>> instead of sneaking it into macros.
> Ack.
>> [...]
>>
>>> +
>>> +void quarantine_reduce(void)
>>> +{
>>> +       size_t new_quarantine_size;
>>> +       unsigned long flags;
>>> +       struct qlist to_free = QLIST_INIT;
>>> +       size_t size_to_free = 0;
>>> +       void **last;
>>> +
>>> +       /* smp_load_acquire() here pairs with smp_store_release() below. */
>>
>> Besides pairing rules, the comment should also explain *why* we need
>> this and for what
>> load/stores it provides memory ordering guarantees. For example take a
>> look at other
>> comments near barriers in the kernel tree.
> Something along the lines of "We must load A before B, hence the barrier"?

Yes.
BTW, do we really need these barriers? I didn't tried to understand
this, thus could be wrong here,
but it seems that READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE would be enough.


>>> +       if (likely(ACCESS_ONCE(global_quarantine.bytes) <=
>>> +                  smp_load_acquire(&quarantine_size)))
>>> +               return;
>>> +
>>>