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Message-ID: <CAJcbSZEHV7ZdDsN=VdKNe0X73Z6kEv-U+TKJG296AwLevwPdVg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 10 May 2016 13:10:19 -0700
From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@....com>,
Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@...il.com>,
Alexander Popov <alpopov@...ecurity.com>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Mark Salter <msalter@...hat.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
Greg Thelen <gthelen@...gle.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] x86, boot: Refactor KASLR entropy functions
On Tue, May 10, 2016 at 12:05 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> wrote:
>> Move the KASLR entropy functions in x86/libray to be used in early
>> kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
>> ---
>> Based on next-20160502
>> ---
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 76 +++-----------------------------------
>> arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h | 6 +++
>> arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 +
>> arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 4 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h
>> create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
>> index 8741a6d..0bdee23 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
>> @@ -11,10 +11,6 @@
>> */
>> #include "misc.h"
>>
>> -#include <asm/msr.h>
>> -#include <asm/archrandom.h>
>> -#include <asm/e820.h>
>> -
>> #include <generated/compile.h>
>> #include <linux/module.h>
>> #include <linux/uts.h>
>> @@ -25,26 +21,6 @@
>> static const char build_str[] = UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@"
>> LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION;
>>
>> -#define I8254_PORT_CONTROL 0x43
>> -#define I8254_PORT_COUNTER0 0x40
>> -#define I8254_CMD_READBACK 0xC0
>> -#define I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0 0x02
>> -#define I8254_STATUS_NOTREADY 0x40
>> -static inline u16 i8254(void)
>> -{
>> - u16 status, timer;
>> -
>> - do {
>> - outb(I8254_PORT_CONTROL,
>> - I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0);
>> - status = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
>> - timer = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
>> - timer |= inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0) << 8;
>> - } while (status & I8254_STATUS_NOTREADY);
>> -
>> - return timer;
>> -}
>> -
>> static unsigned long rotate_xor(unsigned long hash, const void *area,
>> size_t size)
>> {
>> @@ -61,7 +37,7 @@ static unsigned long rotate_xor(unsigned long hash, const void *area,
>> }
>>
>> /* Attempt to create a simple but unpredictable starting entropy. */
>> -static unsigned long get_random_boot(void)
>> +static unsigned long get_boot_seed(void)
>> {
>> unsigned long hash = 0;
>>
>> @@ -71,50 +47,6 @@ static unsigned long get_random_boot(void)
>> return hash;
>> }
>>
>> -static unsigned long get_random_long(void)
>> -{
>> -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> - const unsigned long mix_const = 0x5d6008cbf3848dd3UL;
>> -#else
>> - const unsigned long mix_const = 0x3f39e593UL;
>> -#endif
>> - unsigned long raw, random = get_random_boot();
>> - bool use_i8254 = true;
>> -
>> - debug_putstr("KASLR using");
>> -
>> - if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
>> - debug_putstr(" RDRAND");
>> - if (rdrand_long(&raw)) {
>> - random ^= raw;
>> - use_i8254 = false;
>> - }
>> - }
>> -
>> - if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_TSC)) {
>> - debug_putstr(" RDTSC");
>> - raw = rdtsc();
>> -
>> - random ^= raw;
>> - use_i8254 = false;
>> - }
>> -
>> - if (use_i8254) {
>> - debug_putstr(" i8254");
>> - random ^= i8254();
>> - }
>> -
>> - /* Circular multiply for better bit diffusion */
>> - asm("mul %3"
>> - : "=a" (random), "=d" (raw)
>> - : "a" (random), "rm" (mix_const));
>> - random += raw;
>> -
>> - debug_putstr("...\n");
>> -
>> - return random;
>> -}
>> -
>> struct mem_vector {
>> unsigned long start;
>> unsigned long size;
>> @@ -122,7 +54,6 @@ struct mem_vector {
>>
>> #define MEM_AVOID_MAX 5
>> static struct mem_vector mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MAX];
>> -
>> static bool mem_contains(struct mem_vector *region, struct mem_vector *item)
>> {
>> /* Item at least partially before region. */
>> @@ -229,13 +160,16 @@ static void slots_append(unsigned long addr)
>> slots[slot_max++] = addr;
>> }
>>
>> +#define KASLR_COMPRESSED_BOOT
>> +#include "../../lib/kaslr.c"
>> +
>> static unsigned long slots_fetch_random(void)
>> {
>> /* Handle case of no slots stored. */
>> if (slot_max == 0)
>> return 0;
>>
>> - return slots[get_random_long() % slot_max];
>> + return slots[kaslr_get_random_boot_long() % slot_max];
>> }
>>
>> static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry,
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..2ae1429
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kaslr.h
>> @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
>> +#ifndef _ASM_KASLR_H_
>> +#define _ASM_KASLR_H_
>> +
>> +unsigned long kaslr_get_random_boot_long(void);
>> +
>> +#endif
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
>> index 72a5767..cfa6d07 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
>> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ lib-y += usercopy_$(BITS).o usercopy.o getuser.o putuser.o
>> lib-y += memcpy_$(BITS).o
>> lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o
>> lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o
>> +lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
>>
>> obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..ffb22ba
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
>
> Please add a file header comment here to describe what's contained and
> that it is used in both regular and compressed kernels.
>
Will do.
>> +#include <asm/kaslr.h>
>> +#include <asm/msr.h>
>> +#include <asm/archrandom.h>
>> +#include <asm/e820.h>
>> +#include <asm/io.h>
>> +
>> +/* Replace boot functions on library build */
>
> I'd expand this comment a bit, something like:
>
> /*
> * When built for the regular kernel, several functions need to be stubbed out
> * or changed to their regular kernel equivalent.
> */
>
Will do.
>> +#ifndef KASLR_COMPRESSED_BOOT
>> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
>> +#include <asm/setup.h>
>> +
>> +#define debug_putstr(v)
>
> Hmmm, I don't think this should be removed. Using these routines
> should be uncommon, and it'd be nice to retain the debugging output
> from them. Can this be refactored into an early printk, or is that
> stuff not available yet? If it's not available, I can live with this
> going silent, but it'd be nice to not lose it for the memory
> randomization.
>
>> +#define has_cpuflag(f) boot_cpu_has(f)
>> +#define get_boot_seed() kaslr_offset()
>
> Hmmm... this replacement seed feels like it has much less entropy.
> Also, if RANDOMIZE_MEMORY is decoupled from RANDOMIZE_BASE, this will
> not be cool. :) But I don't feel to strongly about the config coupling
> -- I just wanted to see RANDOMIZE_MEMORY on by default if
> RANDOMIZE_BASE is too.
>
Currently, RANDOMIZE_MEMORY is coupled with RANDOMIZE_BASE. I think it
makes sense that they remain together. Also there is not much additional entropy
available as a base here. The table used on KASLR compressed boot is gone.
>> +#endif
>> +
>> +#define I8254_PORT_CONTROL 0x43
>> +#define I8254_PORT_COUNTER0 0x40
>> +#define I8254_CMD_READBACK 0xC0
>> +#define I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0 0x02
>> +#define I8254_STATUS_NOTREADY 0x40
>> +static inline u16 i8254(void)
>> +{
>> + u16 status, timer;
>> +
>> + do {
>> + outb(I8254_PORT_CONTROL,
>> + I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0);
>> + status = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
>> + timer = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
>> + timer |= inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0) << 8;
>> + } while (status & I8254_STATUS_NOTREADY);
>> +
>> + return timer;
>> +}
>> +
>> +unsigned long kaslr_get_random_boot_long(void)
>
> Sorry again for the refactoring in this area: -tip (and soon -next)
> will make yet another change to this function to carry a const char *
> for the debug_putstr() calls.
>
I will keep an eye on it and send the next iteration when the change arrive
on next.
Thanks for the comments,
Thomas
>> +{
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> + const unsigned long mix_const = 0x5d6008cbf3848dd3UL;
>> +#else
>> + const unsigned long mix_const = 0x3f39e593UL;
>> +#endif
>> + unsigned long raw, random = get_boot_seed();
>> + bool use_i8254 = true;
>> +
>> + debug_putstr("KASLR using");
>> +
>> + if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
>> + debug_putstr(" RDRAND");
>> + if (rdrand_long(&raw)) {
>> + random ^= raw;
>> + use_i8254 = false;
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_TSC)) {
>> + debug_putstr(" RDTSC");
>> + raw = rdtsc();
>> +
>> + random ^= raw;
>> + use_i8254 = false;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (use_i8254) {
>> + debug_putstr(" i8254");
>> + random ^= i8254();
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Circular multiply for better bit diffusion */
>> + asm("mul %3"
>> + : "=a" (random), "=d" (raw)
>> + : "a" (random), "rm" (mix_const));
>> + random += raw;
>> +
>> + debug_putstr("...\n");
>> +
>> + return random;
>> +}
>> --
>> 2.8.0.rc3.226.g39d4020
>>
>
> -Kees
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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