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Message-Id: <1463083435-12828-9-git-send-email-acme@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 12 May 2016 17:03:53 -0300
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
David Ahern <dsahern@...il.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Wang Nan <wangnan0@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH 08/10] perf evsel: Improve EPERM error handling in open_strerror()
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>
We were showing a hardcoded default value for the kernel.perf_event_paranoid
sysctl, now that it became more paranoid (1 -> 2 [1]), this would need to be
updated, instead show the current value:
[acme@...et linux]$ perf record ls
Error:
You may not have permission to collect stats.
Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,
which controls use of the performance events system by
unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
The current value is 2:
-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
>= 0: Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_IOC_LOCK
>= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
[acme@...et linux]$
[1] 0161028b7c8a ("perf/core: Change the default paranoia level to 2")
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@...il.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@...wei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-0gc4rdpg8d025r5not8s8028@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...hat.com>
---
tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
index 738ce226002b..a5f339d447cc 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/evsel.c
@@ -2382,12 +2382,13 @@ int perf_evsel__open_strerror(struct perf_evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
"Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n"
"which controls use of the performance events system by\n"
"unprivileged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
- "The default value is 1:\n\n"
+ "The current value is %d:\n\n"
" -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n"
">= 0: Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_IOC_LOCK\n"
">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN",
- target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "");
+ target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
+ perf_event_paranoid());
case ENOENT:
return scnprintf(msg, size, "The %s event is not supported.",
perf_evsel__name(evsel));
--
2.5.5
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