linux-kernel - [PATCH 0/2] [GIT PULL] ring-buffer: Some overflow fixes

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Message-Id: <20160516142147.136339740@goodmis.org>
Date:	Mon, 16 May 2016 10:21:47 -0400
From:	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] [GIT PULL] ring-buffer: Some overflow  fixes

Linus,

I was hoping to get this to you before you released 4.6, but testing
went into the weekend, and I don't do work over the weekend. This
missed the release. Anyway...

Hao Qin reported an integer overflow possibility with signed and
unsigned numbers in the ring-buffer code.

  https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=118001

At first I did not think this was too much of an issue, because the
overflow would be caught later when either too much data was allocated
or it would trigger RB_WARN_ON() which shuts down the ring buffer.

But looking closer into it, I found that the right settings could bypass
the checks and crash the kernel. Luckily, this is only accessible
by root.

The first fix is to convert all the variables into long, such that
we don't get into issues between 32 bit variables being assigned 64 bit
ones. This fixes the RB_WARN_ON() triggering.

The next fix is to get rid of a duplicate DIV_ROUND_UP() that when called
twice with the right value, can cause a kernel crash.

The first DIV_ROUND_UP() is to normalize the input and it is checked
against the minimum allowable value. But then DIV_ROUND_UP() is called
again, which can overflow due to the (a + b - 1)/b, logic. The first
called upped the value, the second can overflow (with the +b part).

The second call to DIV_ROUND_UP() came in via a second change a while ago
and the code is cleaned up to remove it.

Please pull the latest trace-fixes-v4.6-rc7 tree, which can be found at:

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace.git
trace-fixes-v4.6-rc7

Tag SHA1: d85fb49268a70e889298446b589d34500aa74a41
Head SHA1: 59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6

Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) (2):
      ring-buffer: Use long for nr_pages to avoid overflow failures
      ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()

----
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)