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Message-ID: <87r3czxvea.fsf@gmail.com>
Date:	Wed, 18 May 2016 17:01:33 +0200
From:	Nicolai Stange <nicstange@...il.com>
To:	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>
Cc:	Nicolai Stange <nicstange@...il.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@...6.fr>,
	Gilles Muller <Gilles.Muller@...6.fr>,
	Nicolas Palix <nicolas.palix@...g.fr>,
	Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	cocci@...teme.lip6.fr
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data

Hi Sasha,

Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com> writes:

> On 03/22/2016 09:11 AM, Nicolai Stange wrote:
>> Upon return of debugfs_remove()/debugfs_remove_recursive(), it might
>> still be attempted to access associated private file data through
>> previously opened struct file objects. If that data has been freed by
>> the caller of debugfs_remove*() in the meanwhile, the reading/writing
>> process would either encounter a fault or, if the memory address in
>> question has been reassigned again, unrelated data structures could get
>> overwritten.
>> 
>> However, since debugfs files are seldomly removed, usually from module
>> exit handlers only, the impact is very low.
>> 
>> Currently, there are ~1000 call sites of debugfs_create_file() spread
>> throughout the whole tree and touching all of those struct file_operations
>> in order to make them file removal aware by means of checking the result of
>> debugfs_use_file_start() from within their methods is unfeasible.
>> 
>> Instead, wrap the struct file_operations by a lifetime managing proxy at
>> file open:
>> - In debugfs_create_file(), the original fops handed in has got stashed
>>   away in ->d_fsdata already.
>> - In debugfs_create_file(), install a proxy file_operations factory,
>>   debugfs_full_proxy_file_operations, at ->i_fop.
>> 
>> This proxy factory has got an ->open() method only. It carries out some
>> lifetime checks and if successful, dynamically allocates and sets up a new
>> struct file_operations proxy at ->f_op. Afterwards, it forwards to the
>> ->open() of the original struct file_operations in ->d_fsdata, if any.
>> 
>> The dynamically set up proxy at ->f_op has got a lifetime managing wrapper
>> set for each of the methods defined in the original struct file_operations
>> in ->d_fsdata.
>> 
>> Its ->release()er frees the proxy again and forwards to the original
>> ->release(), if any.
>> 
>> In order not to mislead the VFS layer, it is strictly necessary to leave
>> those fields blank in the proxy that have been NULL in the original
>> struct file_operations also, i.e. aren't supported. This is why there is a
>> need for dynamically allocated proxies. The choice made not to allocate a
>> proxy instance for every dentry at file creation, but for every
>> struct file object instantiated thereof is justified by the expected usage
>> pattern of debugfs, namely that in general very few files get opened more
>> than once at a time.
>> 
>> The wrapper methods set in the struct file_operations implement lifetime
>> managing by means of the SRCU protection facilities already in place for
>> debugfs:
>> They set up a SRCU read side critical section and check whether the dentry
>> is still alive by means of debugfs_use_file_start(). If so, they forward
>> the call to the original struct file_operation stored in ->d_fsdata, still
>> under the protection of the SRCU read side critical section.
>> This SRCU read side critical section prevents any pending debugfs_remove()
>> and friends to return to their callers. Since a file's private data must
>> only be freed after the return of debugfs_remove(), the ongoing proxied
>> call is guarded against any file removal race.
>> 
>> If, on the other hand, the initial call to debugfs_use_file_start() detects
>> that the dentry is dead, the wrapper simply returns -EIO and does not
>> forward the call. Note that the ->poll() wrapper is special in that its
>> signature does not allow for the return of arbitrary -EXXX values and thus,
>> POLLHUP is returned here.
>> 
>> In order not to pollute debugfs with wrapper definitions that aren't ever
>> needed, I chose not to define a wrapper for every struct file_operations
>> method possible. Instead, a wrapper is defined only for the subset of
>> methods which are actually set by any debugfs users.
>> Currently, these are:
>> 
>>   ->llseek()
>>   ->read()
>>   ->write()
>>   ->unlocked_ioctl()
>>   ->poll()
>> 
>> The ->release() wrapper is special in that it does not protect the original
>> ->release() in any way from dead files in order not to leak resources.
>> Thus, any ->release() handed to debugfs must implement file lifetime
>> management manually, if needed.
>> For only 33 out of a total of 434 releasers handed in to debugfs, it could
>> not be verified immediately whether they access data structures that might
>> have been freed upon a debugfs_remove() return in the meanwhile.
>> 
>> Export debugfs_use_file_start() and debugfs_use_file_finish() in order to
>> allow any ->release() to manually implement file lifetime management.
>> 
>> For a set of common cases of struct file_operations implemented by the
>> debugfs_core itself, future patches will incorporate file lifetime
>> management directly within those in order to allow for their unproxied
>> operation. Rename the original, non-proxying "debugfs_create_file()" to
>> "debugfs_create_file_unsafe()" and keep it for future internal use by
>> debugfs itself. Factor out code common to both into the new
>> __debugfs_create_file().
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@...il.com>

Thanks a million for reporting!

1.) Do you have lockdep enabled?

2.) Does this happen before or after userspace init has been spawned,
    i.e. does the lockup happen at debugfs file creation time or
    possibly at usage time?

Thank you,

Nicolai

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