linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.12 38/76] proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready

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Message-Id: <cdfaba237820a99bad60d947530725151a611ca0.1463648873.git.jslaby@suse.cz>
Date:	Thu, 19 May 2016 11:08:00 +0200
From:	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To:	stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
	Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
	Pax Team <pageexec@...email.hu>,
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@...hat.com>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>,
	Jarod Wilson <jarod@...hat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 3.12 38/76] proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready

From: Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3 upstream.

If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.

Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero.  It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().

This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.

The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.

Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@...email.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@...hat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 293c987a5dab..582d34aaa56e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -844,7 +844,8 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	int ret = 0;
 	struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;

-	if (!mm)
+	/* Ensure the process spawned far enough to have an environment. */
+	if (!mm || !mm->env_end)
 		return 0;

 	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
-- 
2.8.2