linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data

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Message-ID: <573F4171.4080804@oracle.com>
Date:	Fri, 20 May 2016 12:55:13 -0400
From:	Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>
To:	Nicolai Stange <nicstange@...il.com>
Cc:	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@...6.fr>,
	Gilles Muller <Gilles.Muller@...6.fr>,
	Nicolas Palix <nicolas.palix@...g.fr>,
	Michal Marek <mmarek@...e.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	cocci@...teme.lip6.fr
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 2/8] debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private
 data

On 05/18/2016 12:32 PM, Nicolai Stange wrote:
> Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com> writes:
> 
>> On 05/18/2016 11:01 AM, Nicolai Stange wrote:
>>> Thanks a million for reporting!
>>>
>>> 1.) Do you have lockdep enabled?
>>
>> Yup, nothing there.
>>
>>> 2.) Does this happen before or after userspace init has been spawned,
>>>     i.e. does the lockup happen at debugfs file creation time or
>>>     possibly at usage time?
>>
>> So I looked closer, and it seems to happen after starting syzkaller, which
>> as far as I know tries to open many different debugfs files.
>>
>> Is there debug code I can add it that'll help us figure out what's up?
> 
> Could you try the patch below? I stared at the new full_proxy_open() for
> a while now and had to recognize the fact that if the original real_fops'
> ->open() fails, then its owning module's reference won't ever get
> dropped :(
> 
> diff --git a/fs/debugfs/file.c b/fs/debugfs/file.c
> index 6eb58a8..2e663d4 100644
> --- a/fs/debugfs/file.c
> +++ b/fs/debugfs/file.c
> @@ -263,10 +263,14 @@ static int full_proxy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
>         if (real_fops->open) {
>                 r = real_fops->open(inode, filp);
> 
> -               if (filp->f_op != proxy_fops) {
> +               if (r) {
> +                       replace_fops(filp, d_inode(dentry)->i_fop);
> +                       goto free_proxy;
> +               } else if (filp->f_op != proxy_fops) {
>                         /* No protection against file removal anymore. */
>                         WARN(1, "debugfs file owner replaced proxy fops: %pd",
>                                 dentry);
> +                       replace_fops(filp, d_inode(dentry)->i_fop);
>                         goto free_proxy;
>                 }
>         }
> 
> 
> I don't see directly how this could lead to lockups, but I think it's
> better to rule out the obvious before inserting more or less random
> printks...
> 
> Thank you very much again,

Nope, that didn't do the trick.


Thanks,
Sasha