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Message-ID: <CAJcbSZF513mzpgoiHbApr8+Rj+V+B4hwLTYCoz4GMbfuZE4msA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Thu, 26 May 2016 11:40:56 -0700
From:	Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
To:	Joonsoo Kim <js1304@...il.com>
Cc:	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@...il.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
	Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
	David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@...el.com>,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Greg Thelen <gthelen@...gle.com>,
	kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 2/2] mm: SLUB Freelist randomization

On Wed, May 25, 2016 at 6:49 PM, Joonsoo Kim <js1304@...il.com> wrote:
> 2016-05-25 6:15 GMT+09:00 Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>:
>> Implements Freelist randomization for the SLUB allocator. It was
>> previous implemented for the SLAB allocator. Both use the same
>> configuration option (CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM).
>>
>> The list is randomized during initialization of a new set of pages. The
>> order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot for
>> performance. Each kmem_cache has its own randomized freelist. This
>> security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel SLUB allocator
>> against heap overflows rendering attacks much less stable.
>>
>> For example these attacks exploit the predictability of the heap:
>>  - Linux Kernel CAN SLUB overflow (https://goo.gl/oMNWkU)
>>  - Exploiting Linux Kernel Heap corruptions (http://goo.gl/EXLn95)
>>
>> Performance results:
>>
>> slab_test impact is between 3% to 4% on average:
>>
>> Before:
>>
>> Single thread testing
>> =====================
>> 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test
>> 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 49 cycles kfree -> 77 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 51 cycles kfree -> 79 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 53 cycles kfree -> 83 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 62 cycles kfree -> 90 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 81 cycles kfree -> 97 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 98 cycles kfree -> 121 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 95 cycles kfree -> 122 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 96 cycles kfree -> 126 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 140 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 149 cycles kfree -> 171 cycles
>> 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test
>> 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 70 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 70 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 70 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 70 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 70 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 69 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 70 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 73 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 72 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 71 cycles
>>
>> After:
>>
>> Single thread testing
>> =====================
>> 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test
>> 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 57 cycles kfree -> 78 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 61 cycles kfree -> 81 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 76 cycles kfree -> 93 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 83 cycles kfree -> 94 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 106 cycles kfree -> 107 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 117 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 114 cycles kfree -> 116 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 118 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 147 cycles kfree -> 131 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 214 cycles kfree -> 161 cycles
>> 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test
>> 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 66 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 66 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 66 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 66 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 65 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 67 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 67 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 64 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 67 cycles
>> 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 67 cycles
>>
>> Kernbench, before:
>>
>> Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation):
>> Elapsed Time 101.873 (1.16069)
>> User Time 1045.22 (1.60447)
>> System Time 88.969 (0.559195)
>> Percent CPU 1112.9 (13.8279)
>> Context Switches 189140 (2282.15)
>> Sleeps 99008.6 (768.091)
>>
>> After:
>>
>> Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation):
>> Elapsed Time 102.47 (0.562732)
>> User Time 1045.3 (1.34263)
>> System Time 88.311 (0.342554)
>> Percent CPU 1105.8 (6.49444)
>> Context Switches 189081 (2355.78)
>> Sleeps 99231.5 (800.358)
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
>> ---
>> Based on 0e01df100b6bf22a1de61b66657502a6454153c5
>> ---
>>  include/linux/slub_def.h |   8 +++
>>  init/Kconfig             |   4 +-
>>  mm/slub.c                | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>>  3 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h
>> index 665cd0c..22d487e 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/slub_def.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h
>> @@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ struct kmem_cache_order_objects {
>>         unsigned long x;
>>  };
>>
>> +/* Index used for freelist randomization */
>> +typedef unsigned int freelist_idx_t;
>> +
>>  /*
>>   * Slab cache management.
>>   */
>> @@ -99,6 +102,11 @@ struct kmem_cache {
>>          */
>>         int remote_node_defrag_ratio;
>>  #endif
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
>> +       freelist_idx_t *random_seq;
>> +#endif
>> +
>>         struct kmem_cache_node *node[MAX_NUMNODES];
>>  };
>>
>> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
>> index a9c4aefd..fbb6678 100644
>> --- a/init/Kconfig
>> +++ b/init/Kconfig
>> @@ -1771,10 +1771,10 @@ endchoice
>>
>>  config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
>>         default n
>> -       depends on SLAB
>> +       depends on SLAB || SLUB
>>         bool "SLAB freelist randomization"
>>         help
>> -         Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new SLABs. This
>> +         Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This
>>           security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab
>>           allocator against heap overflows.
>>
>> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
>> index 825ff45..217aa8a 100644
>> --- a/mm/slub.c
>> +++ b/mm/slub.c
>> @@ -1405,6 +1405,109 @@ static inline struct page *alloc_slab_page(struct kmem_cache *s,
>>         return page;
>>  }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
>> +/* Pre-initialize the random sequence cache */
>> +static int init_cache_random_seq(struct kmem_cache *s)
>> +{
>> +       int err;
>> +       unsigned long i, count = oo_objects(s->oo);
>> +
>> +       err = cache_random_seq_create(s, count, GFP_KERNEL);
>> +       if (err) {
>> +               pr_err("SLUB: Unable to initialize free list for %s\n",
>> +                       s->name);
>> +               return err;
>> +       }
>> +
>> +       /* Transform to an offset on the set of pages */
>> +       if (s->random_seq) {
>> +               for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
>> +                       s->random_seq[i] *= s->size;
>> +       }
>> +       return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/* Initialize each random sequence freelist per cache */
>> +static void __init init_freelist_randomization(void)
>> +{
>> +       struct kmem_cache *s;
>> +
>> +       mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
>> +
>> +       list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list)
>> +               init_cache_random_seq(s);
>> +
>> +       mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/* Get the next entry on the pre-computed freelist randomized */
>> +static void *next_freelist_entry(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
>> +                               unsigned long *pos, void *start,
>> +                               unsigned long page_limit,
>> +                               unsigned long freelist_count)
>> +{
>> +       freelist_idx_t idx;
>> +
>> +       /*
>> +        * If the target page allocation failed, the number of objects on the
>> +        * page might be smaller than the usual size defined by the cache.
>> +        */
>> +       do {
>> +               idx = s->random_seq[*pos];
>> +               *pos += 1;
>> +               if (*pos >= freelist_count)
>> +                       *pos = 0;
>> +       } while (unlikely(idx >= page_limit));
>> +
>> +       return (char *)start + idx;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/* Shuffle the single linked freelist based on a random pre-computed sequence */
>> +static bool shuffle_freelist(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page)
>> +{
>> +       void *start;
>> +       void *cur;
>> +       void *next;
>> +       unsigned long idx, pos, page_limit, freelist_count;
>> +
>> +       if (page->objects < 2 || !s->random_seq)
>> +               return false;
>> +
>> +       freelist_count = oo_objects(s->oo);
>> +       pos = get_random_int() % freelist_count;
>> +
>> +       page_limit = page->objects * s->size;
>> +       start = fixup_red_left(s, page_address(page));
>> +
>> +       /* First entry is used as the base of the freelist */
>> +       cur = next_freelist_entry(s, page, &pos, start, page_limit,
>> +                               freelist_count);
>> +       page->freelist = cur;
>> +
>> +       for (idx = 1; idx < page->objects; idx++) {
>> +               setup_object(s, page, cur);
>> +               next = next_freelist_entry(s, page, &pos, start, page_limit,
>> +                       freelist_count);
>> +               set_freepointer(s, cur, next);
>> +               cur = next;
>> +       }
>> +       setup_object(s, page, cur);
>> +       set_freepointer(s, cur, NULL);
>> +
>> +       return true;
>> +}
>> +#else
>> +static inline int init_cache_random_seq(struct kmem_cache *s)
>> +{
>> +       return 0;
>> +}
>> +static inline void init_freelist_randomization(void) { }
>> +static inline bool shuffle_freelist(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page)
>> +{
>> +       return false;
>> +}
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM */
>> +
>>  static struct page *allocate_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
>>  {
>>         struct page *page;
>> @@ -1412,6 +1515,7 @@ static struct page *allocate_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
>>         gfp_t alloc_gfp;
>>         void *start, *p;
>>         int idx, order;
>> +       bool shuffle;
>>
>>         flags &= gfp_allowed_mask;
>>
>> @@ -1473,15 +1577,19 @@ static struct page *allocate_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
>>
>>         kasan_poison_slab(page);
>>
>> -       for_each_object_idx(p, idx, s, start, page->objects) {
>> -               setup_object(s, page, p);
>> -               if (likely(idx < page->objects))
>> -                       set_freepointer(s, p, p + s->size);
>> -               else
>> -                       set_freepointer(s, p, NULL);
>> +       shuffle = shuffle_freelist(s, page);
>> +
>> +       if (!shuffle) {
>> +               for_each_object_idx(p, idx, s, start, page->objects) {
>> +                       setup_object(s, page, p);
>> +                       if (likely(idx < page->objects))
>> +                               set_freepointer(s, p, p + s->size);
>> +                       else
>> +                               set_freepointer(s, p, NULL);
>> +               }
>> +               page->freelist = fixup_red_left(s, start);
>>         }
>>
>> -       page->freelist = fixup_red_left(s, start);
>>         page->inuse = page->objects;
>>         page->frozen = 1;
>>
>> @@ -3207,6 +3315,7 @@ static void free_kmem_cache_nodes(struct kmem_cache *s)
>>
>>  void __kmem_cache_release(struct kmem_cache *s)
>>  {
>> +       cache_random_seq_destroy(s);
>>         free_percpu(s->cpu_slab);
>>         free_kmem_cache_nodes(s);
>>  }
>> @@ -3431,6 +3540,13 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, unsigned long flags)
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
>>         s->remote_node_defrag_ratio = 1000;
>>  #endif
>> +
>> +       /* Initialize the pre-computed randomized freelist if slab is up */
>> +       if (slab_state >= UP) {
>> +               if (init_cache_random_seq(s))
>> +                       goto error;
>> +       }
>> +
>>         if (!init_kmem_cache_nodes(s))
>>                 goto error;
>>
>> @@ -3947,6 +4063,9 @@ void __init kmem_cache_init(void)
>>         setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table();
>>         create_kmalloc_caches(0);
>>
>> +       /* Setup random freelists for each cache */
>> +       init_freelist_randomization();
>
> dma kmalloc caches are initialized with slab_state = UP.
> That means that it's random_seq is initialized twice and
> some memory would leak.
>
> Maybe, you need to check if random_seq is already initialized
> or not in init_cache_randome_seq().

Thanks, I will look into that.

>
> Others look fine to me.
>

Thanks, I will move to PATCH on next iteration (based on linux-next
related to the other thread).

> Thanks.

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