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Message-ID: <CACT4Y+ZBSEpqi+aUFdKZk9ncRzAxPpBRLV8DGrEuSWSBNbdpAQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 29 May 2016 16:27:53 +0200
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@....com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Yury Norov <ynorov@...iumnetworks.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] mm, kasan: improve double-free detection
On Tue, May 24, 2016 at 8:30 PM, Kuthonuzo Luruo
<kuthonuzo.luruo@....com> wrote:
> Currently, KASAN may fail to detect concurrent deallocations of the same
> object due to a race in kasan_slab_free(). This patch makes double-free
> detection more reliable by serializing access to KASAN object metadata.
> New functions kasan_meta_lock() and kasan_meta_unlock() are provided to
> lock/unlock per-object metadata. Double-free errors are now reported via
> kasan_report().
>
> Per-object lock concept from suggestion/observations by Dmitry Vyukov.
>
> Testing:
> - Tested with a modified version of the 'slab_test' microbenchmark where
> allocs occur on CPU 0; then all other CPUs concurrently attempt to free
> the same object.
> - Tested with new double-free tests for 'test_kasan' in accompanying patch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@....com>
> ---
>
> Changes in v3:
> - simplified kasan_meta_lock()/unlock() to use generic bit spinlock apis;
> kasan_alloc_meta structure modified accordingly.
> - introduced a 'safety valve' for kasan_meta_lock() to prevent a kfree from
> getting stuck when a prior out-of-bounds write clobbers the object
> header.
> - removed potentially unsafe __builtin_return_address(1) from
> kasan_report() call per review comment from Yury Norov; callee now passed
> into kasan_slab_free().
>
> ---
> include/linux/kasan.h | 7 +++-
> mm/kasan/kasan.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
> mm/kasan/quarantine.c | 2 +
> mm/kasan/report.c | 28 ++++++++++++++--
> mm/slab.c | 3 +-
> mm/slub.c | 2 +-
> 7 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 611927f..3db974b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t *size,
> void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache);
> void kasan_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cache);
>
> +void kasan_init_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
> void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
> void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
> void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
> @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object, size_t size,
> void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags);
>
> void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, gfp_t flags);
> -bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
> +bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long caller);
> void kasan_poison_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
>
> struct kasan_cache {
> @@ -94,6 +95,7 @@ static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> static inline void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache) {}
> static inline void kasan_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cache) {}
>
> +static inline void kasan_init_object(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) {}
> static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) {}
> static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> void *object) {}
> @@ -110,7 +112,8 @@ static inline void kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t new_size,
>
> static inline void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> gfp_t flags) {}
> -static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
> +static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
> + unsigned long caller)
> {
> return false;
> }
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> index 18b6a2b..ab82e24 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> @@ -402,6 +402,35 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t *size,
> cache->object_size +
> optimal_redzone(cache->object_size)));
> }
> +
> +void kasan_init_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> +{
> + if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN) {
> + struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info;
> +
> + alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
> + __memset(alloc_info, 0, sizeof(*alloc_info));
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/* flags shadow for object header if it has been overwritten. */
> +void kasan_mark_bad_meta(struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info,
> + struct kasan_access_info *info)
> +{
> + u8 *datap = (u8 *)&alloc_info->data;
> +
> + if ((((u8 *)info->access_addr + info->access_size) > datap) &&
> + ((u8 *)info->first_bad_addr <= datap) &&
> + info->is_write)
> + kasan_poison_shadow((void *)datap, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE,
> + KASAN_KMALLOC_BAD_META);
Is it only to prevent deadlocks in kasan_meta_lock?
If so, it is still unrelable because an OOB write can happen in
non-instrumented code. Or, kasan_meta_lock can successfully lock
overwritten garbage before noticing KASAN_KMALLOC_BAD_META. Or, two
threads can assume lock ownership after noticing
KASAN_KMALLOC_BAD_META.
After the first report we continue working in kind of best effort
mode: we can try to mitigate some things, but generally all bets are
off. Because of that there is no need to build something complex,
global (and still unrelable). I would just wait for at most, say, 10
seconds in kasan_meta_lock, if we can't get the lock -- print an error
and return. That's simple, local and won't deadlock under any
circumstances.
The error message will be helpful, because there are chances we will
report a double-free on free of the corrupted object.
e
Tests can be arranged so that they write 0 (unlocked) into the meta
(if necessary).
> +}
> +
> +static void kasan_unmark_bad_meta(struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info)
> +{
> + kasan_poison_shadow((void *)&alloc_info->data, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE,
> + KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> +}
> #endif
>
> void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache)
> @@ -431,13 +460,6 @@ void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> kasan_poison_shadow(object,
> round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
> KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
> - if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN) {
> - struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info =
> - get_alloc_info(cache, object);
> - alloc_info->state = KASAN_STATE_INIT;
> - }
> -#endif
> }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
> @@ -520,35 +542,41 @@ void kasan_poison_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> kasan_poison_shadow(object, rounded_up_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
> }
>
> -bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
> +bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
> + unsigned long caller)
> {
> #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
> + struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info;
> + struct kasan_free_meta *free_info;
> +
> /* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
> if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
> return false;
>
> - if (likely(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)) {
> - struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info =
> - get_alloc_info(cache, object);
> - struct kasan_free_meta *free_info =
> - get_free_info(cache, object);
> -
> - switch (alloc_info->state) {
> - case KASAN_STATE_ALLOC:
> - alloc_info->state = KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE;
> - quarantine_put(free_info, cache);
> - set_track(&free_info->track, GFP_NOWAIT);
> - kasan_poison_slab_free(cache, object);
> - return true;
> + if (unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
> + return false;
> +
> + alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
> + kasan_meta_lock(alloc_info);
> + if (alloc_info->state == KASAN_STATE_ALLOC) {
> + free_info = get_free_info(cache, object);
> + quarantine_put(free_info, cache);
> + set_track(&free_info->track, GFP_NOWAIT);
> + kasan_poison_slab_free(cache, object);
> + alloc_info->state = KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE;
> + kasan_meta_unlock(alloc_info);
> + return true;
> + }
> + switch (alloc_info->state) {
> case KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE:
> case KASAN_STATE_FREE:
> - pr_err("Double free");
> - dump_stack();
> - break;
> + kasan_report((unsigned long)object, 0, false, caller);
> + kasan_meta_unlock(alloc_info);
> + return true;
> default:
Please at least print some here (it is not meant to happen, right?).
> break;
> - }
> }
> + kasan_meta_unlock(alloc_info);
> return false;
> #else
> kasan_poison_slab_free(cache, object);
> @@ -580,10 +608,16 @@ void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
> if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN) {
> struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info =
> get_alloc_info(cache, object);
> + unsigned long flags;
>
> + local_irq_save(flags);
> + kasan_meta_lock(alloc_info);
> alloc_info->state = KASAN_STATE_ALLOC;
> - alloc_info->alloc_size = size;
> + alloc_info->size_delta = cache->object_size - size;
> set_track(&alloc_info->track, flags);
> + kasan_unmark_bad_meta(alloc_info);
> + kasan_meta_unlock(alloc_info);
> + local_irq_restore(flags);
> }
> #endif
> }
> @@ -636,7 +670,7 @@ void kasan_kfree(void *ptr)
> kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page),
> KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
> else
> - kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr);
> + kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, _RET_IP_);
> }
>
> void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr)
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index fb87923..ceaf016 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -3,12 +3,14 @@
>
> #include <linux/kasan.h>
> #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
> +#include <linux/bit_spinlock.h>
>
> #define KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
> #define KASAN_SHADOW_MASK (KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
>
> #define KASAN_FREE_PAGE 0xFF /* page was freed */
> #define KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE 0xFE /* redzone for kmalloc_large allocations */
> +#define KASAN_KMALLOC_BAD_META 0xFD /* slab object header was overwritten */
> #define KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE 0xFC /* redzone inside slub object */
> #define KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE 0xFB /* object was freed (kmem_cache_free/kfree) */
> #define KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE 0xFA /* redzone for global variable */
> @@ -74,9 +76,17 @@ struct kasan_track {
> };
>
> struct kasan_alloc_meta {
> + union {
> + u64 data;
> + struct {
> + u32 lock : 1; /* lock bit */
Add a comment that kasan_meta_lock expects this to be the first bit.
> + u32 state : 2; /* enum kasan_state */
> + u32 size_delta : 23; /* object_size - alloc size */
> + u32 unused1 : 6;
> + u32 unused2;
> + };
> + };
> struct kasan_track track;
> - u32 state : 2; /* enum kasan_state */
> - u32 alloc_size : 30;
> };
>
> struct qlist_node {
> @@ -114,6 +124,36 @@ void kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
> void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info, struct kmem_cache *cache);
> void quarantine_reduce(void);
> void quarantine_remove_cache(struct kmem_cache *cache);
> +
> +/* acquire per-object lock for access to KASAN metadata. */
> +static inline void kasan_meta_lock(struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info)
> +{
> + unsigned long *lockp = (unsigned long *)&alloc_info->data;
> +
> + while (unlikely(!bit_spin_trylock(0, lockp))) {
> + u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)lockp);
> +
> + if (READ_ONCE(*shadow) == KASAN_KMALLOC_BAD_META) {
> + /*
> + * a prior out-of-bounds access overwrote object header,
> + * flipping lock bit; break out to allow deallocation.
> + */
> + preempt_disable();
> + return;
> + }
> + while (test_bit(0, lockp))
> + cpu_relax();
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/* release lock after a kasan_meta_lock(). */
> +static inline void kasan_meta_unlock(struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info)
> +{
> + __bit_spin_unlock(0, (unsigned long *)&alloc_info->data);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_mark_bad_meta(struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info,
> + struct kasan_access_info *info);
> #else
> static inline void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info,
> struct kmem_cache *cache) { }
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> index 4973505..c4d45cb 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> @@ -148,7 +148,9 @@ static void qlink_free(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
> unsigned long flags;
>
> local_irq_save(flags);
> + kasan_meta_lock(alloc_info);
> alloc_info->state = KASAN_STATE_FREE;
> + kasan_meta_unlock(alloc_info);
> ___cache_free(cache, object, _THIS_IP_);
> local_irq_restore(flags);
> }
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
> index b3c122d..4d0d70d 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
> @@ -53,6 +53,17 @@ static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
> u8 *shadow_addr;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
> + if (!info->access_size) {
> + bug_type = "double-free";
> + pr_err("BUG: KASAN: %s attempt in %pS on object at addr %p\n",
> + bug_type, (void *)info->ip, info->access_addr);
> + pr_err("%s by task %s/%d\n", bug_type, current->comm,
> + task_pid_nr(current));
> + info->first_bad_addr = info->access_addr;
> + return;
> + }
> +#endif
> info->first_bad_addr = find_first_bad_addr(info->access_addr,
> info->access_size);
>
> @@ -75,6 +86,7 @@ static void print_error_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> break;
> case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
> case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
> + case KASAN_KMALLOC_BAD_META:
> bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
> break;
> case KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE:
> @@ -131,7 +143,7 @@ static void print_track(struct kasan_track *track)
> }
>
> static void object_err(struct kmem_cache *cache, struct page *page,
> - void *object, char *unused_reason)
> + void *object, struct kasan_access_info *info)
> {
> struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
> struct kasan_free_meta *free_info;
> @@ -140,20 +152,22 @@ static void object_err(struct kmem_cache *cache, struct page *page,
> pr_err("Object at %p, in cache %s\n", object, cache->name);
> if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
> return;
> + if (info->access_size)
> + kasan_meta_lock(alloc_info);
> switch (alloc_info->state) {
> case KASAN_STATE_INIT:
> pr_err("Object not allocated yet\n");
> break;
> case KASAN_STATE_ALLOC:
> pr_err("Object allocated with size %u bytes.\n",
> - alloc_info->alloc_size);
> + (cache->object_size - alloc_info->size_delta));
> pr_err("Allocation:\n");
> print_track(&alloc_info->track);
> break;
> case KASAN_STATE_FREE:
> case KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE:
> pr_err("Object freed, allocated with size %u bytes\n",
> - alloc_info->alloc_size);
> + (cache->object_size - alloc_info->size_delta));
> free_info = get_free_info(cache, object);
> pr_err("Allocation:\n");
> print_track(&alloc_info->track);
> @@ -161,6 +175,10 @@ static void object_err(struct kmem_cache *cache, struct page *page,
> print_track(&free_info->track);
> break;
> }
> + if (info->access_size) {
> + kasan_mark_bad_meta(alloc_info, info);
> + kasan_meta_unlock(alloc_info);
> + }
> }
> #endif
>
> @@ -177,8 +195,12 @@ static void print_address_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> struct kmem_cache *cache = page->slab_cache;
> object = nearest_obj(cache, page,
> (void *)info->access_addr);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
> + object_err(cache, page, object, info);
> +#else
> object_err(cache, page, object,
> "kasan: bad access detected");
> +#endif
> return;
> }
> dump_page(page, "kasan: bad access detected");
> diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
> index cc8bbc1..f7addb3 100644
> --- a/mm/slab.c
> +++ b/mm/slab.c
> @@ -2651,6 +2651,7 @@ static void cache_init_objs(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
> cachep->ctor(objp);
> kasan_poison_object_data(cachep, objp);
> }
> + kasan_init_object(cachep, index_to_obj(cachep, page, i));
>
> if (!shuffled)
> set_free_obj(page, i, i);
> @@ -3548,7 +3549,7 @@ static inline void __cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp,
> unsigned long caller)
> {
> /* Put the object into the quarantine, don't touch it for now. */
> - if (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp))
> + if (kasan_slab_free(cachep, objp, _RET_IP_))
> return;
>
> ___cache_free(cachep, objp, caller);
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index 825ff45..21c2b78 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@ static inline void slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
> if (!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS))
> debug_check_no_obj_freed(x, s->object_size);
>
> - kasan_slab_free(s, x);
> + kasan_slab_free(s, x, _RET_IP_);
> }
>
> static inline void slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
> --
> 1.7.1
>
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