linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/1] shiftfs: uid/gid shifting filesystem

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Message-ID: <2b58696f-492c-3230-0a3c-2f6f9fbff931@poczta.onet.pl>
Date:	Wed, 1 Jun 2016 18:21:07 +0200
From:	Michał Zegan <webczat_200@...zta.onet.pl>
To:	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>, Chris Mason <clm@...com>,
	tytso@....edu, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
	Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Dongsu Park <dongsu@...ocode.com>,
	David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...glemail.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>,
	Alban Crequy <alban.crequy@...il.com>,
	Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/1] shiftfs: uid/gid shifting filesystem

As I sent a reply in a ... wrong way, I do it again. my question was:
Why isn't it done at the vfs layer when you mount the fs in different
userns, instead of using a separate filesystem for it? I believe it
could be useful to be able to mount all filesystems in userns with
autoshifted uids, although I do not know security implications for that
usage.

W dniu 01.06.2016 o 02:29, James Bottomley pisze:
> [This patch is updated for the new VFS APIs in 4.7-rc1; it's also been
> updated as Serge has been hammering on it]
> 
> My use case for this is that I run a lot of unprivileged architectural
> emulation containers on my system using user namespaces.  Details here:
> 
> http://blog.hansenpartnership.com/unprivileged-build-containers/
> 
> They're mostly for building non-x86 stuff (like aarch64 and arm secure
> boot and mips images).  For builds, I have all the environments in my
> home directory with downshifted uids; however, sometimes I need to use
> them to administer real images that run on systems, meaning the uids
> are the usual privileged ones not the downshifted ones.  The only
> current choice I have is to start the emulation as root so the uid/gids
> match.  The reason for this filesystem is to use my standard
> unprivileged containers to maintain these images.  The way I do this is
> crack the image with a loop and then shift the uids before bringing up
> the container.  I usually loop mount into /var/tmp/images/, so it's
> owned by real root there:
> 
> jarvis:~ # ls -l /var/tmp/images/mips|head -4
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 8192 May 12 08:33 bin
> drwxr-xr-x 1 root root    6 May 12 08:33 boot
> drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  167 May 12 08:33 dev
> 
> And I usually run my build containers with a uid_map of 
> 
>          0     100000       1000
>       1000       1000          1
>      65534     101000          1
> 
> (maps 0-999 shifted, then shifts nobody to 1000 and keeps my uid [1000]
> fixed so I can mount my home directory into the namespace) and
> something similar with gid_map. So I shift mount the mips image with
> 
> mount -t shiftfs -o
> uidmap=0:100000:1000,uidmap=65534:101000:1,gidmap=0:100000:100,gidmap=1
> 01:100101:899,gidmap=65533:101000:2 /var/tmp/images/mips
> /home/jejb/containers/mips
> 
> and I now see it as
> 
> jejb@...vis:~> ls -l containers/mips|head -4
> total 0
> drwxr-xr-x 1 100000 100000 8192 May 12 08:33 bin/
> drwxr-xr-x 1 100000 100000    6 May 12 08:33 boot/
> drwxr-xr-x 1 100000 100000  167 May 12 08:33 dev/
> 
> Like my usual unprivileged build roots and I can now use an
> unprivileged container to enter and administer the image.
> 
> It seems like a lot of container systems need to do something similar
> when they try and provide unprivileged access to standard images. 
>  Right at the moment, the security mechanism only allows root in the
> host to use this, but it's not impossible to come up with a scheme for
> marking trees that can safely be shift mounted by unprivileged user
> namespaces.
> 
> James
> 
> ---
> 
>  fs/Kconfig                 |   8 +
>  fs/Makefile                |   1 +
>  fs/shiftfs.c               | 877 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/uapi/linux/magic.h |   2 +
>  4 files changed, 888 insertions(+)
> 



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