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Message-Id: <1465506124-21866-12-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 14:02:01 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@...lanox.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@....de>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@...isc-linux.org>,
James Hogan <james.hogan@...tec.com>,
Jeff Dike <jdike@...toit.com>, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-mips@...ux-mips.org,
linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@...tec.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Ralf Baechle <ralf@...ux-mips.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
user-mode-linux-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, x86@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH 11/14] s390/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace
Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@...r.kernel.org
---
arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c | 21 +++++++++------------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
index c238e9958c2a..cea17010448f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -821,15 +821,6 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- long ret = 0;
-
- /* Do the secure computing check first. */
- if (secure_computing(NULL)) {
- /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
- ret = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-
/*
* The sysc_tracesys code in entry.S stored the system
* call number to gprs[2].
@@ -843,7 +834,13 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
* the system call and the system call restart handling.
*/
clear_pt_regs_flag(regs, PIF_SYSCALL);
- ret = -1;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */
+ if (secure_computing(NULL)) {
+ /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
+ return -1;
}
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
@@ -852,8 +849,8 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
audit_syscall_entry(regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2,
regs->gprs[3], regs->gprs[4],
regs->gprs[5]);
-out:
- return ret ?: regs->gprs[2];
+
+ return regs->gprs[2];
}
asmlinkage void do_syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
--
2.7.4
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