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Message-ID: <20160613112348.GC6518@dhcp22.suse.cz>
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2016 13:23:49 +0200
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>
To: linux-mm@...ck.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@...allels.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/10 -v4] Handle oom bypass more gracefully
On Thu 09-06-16 13:52:07, Michal Hocko wrote:
> I would like to explore ways how to remove kthreads (use_mm) special
> case. It shouldn't be that hard, we just have to teach the page fault
> handler to recognize oom victim mm and enforce EFAULT for kthreads
> which have borrowed that mm.
So I was trying to come up with solution for this which would require to
hook into the pagefault an enforce EFAULT when the mm is being reaped
by the oom_repaer. Not hard but then I have checked the current users
and none of them is really needing to read from the userspace (aka
copy_from_user/get_user). So we actually do not need to do anything
special. Copying _to_ the userspace should be OK because there is no
risk of the corruption. So I believe we should be able to simply do the
following. Or is anybody seeing a reason this would be unsafe?
---
>From 136eabbee783e3e21ea07b289d38e4f947c84850 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2016 16:27:49 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] oom, oom_reaper: allow to reap mm shared by the kthreads
oom reaper was skipped for an mm which is shared with the kernel thread
(aka use_mm()). The primary concern was that such a kthread might want
to read from the userspace memory and see zero page as a result of the
oom reaper action. This seems to be overly conservative because none of
the current use_mm() users need to do copy_from_user or get_user. aio
code used to rely on copy_from_user but this is long gone along with
use_mm() usage in fs/aio.c.
We currently have only 3 users in the kernel:
- ffs_user_copy_worker, ep_user_copy_worker only do copy_to_iter()
- vhost_worker only copies over to the userspace as well AFAICS
In fact relying on copy_from_user in the kernel thread context is quite
dubious because it expects an active cooperation from the userspace to
have a consistent data (e.g. userspace can do MADV_DONTNEED as well).
Add a note to use_mm about the copy_from_user risk and allow the oom
killer to invoke the oom_reaper for mms shared with kthreads. This will
practically cause all the sane use cases to be reapable.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>
---
mm/mmu_context.c | 5 +++++
mm/oom_kill.c | 14 +++++++-------
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/mmu_context.c b/mm/mmu_context.c
index f802c2d216a7..27449747f8de 100644
--- a/mm/mmu_context.c
+++ b/mm/mmu_context.c
@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@
* mm context.
* (Note: this routine is intended to be called only
* from a kernel thread context)
+ *
+ * Do not use copy_from_user from this context because the
+ * address space might got reclaimed behind the back by
+ * the oom_reaper so an unexpected zero page might be
+ * encountered.
*/
void use_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
diff --git a/mm/oom_kill.c b/mm/oom_kill.c
index 6303bc7caeda..b6a7027643b6 100644
--- a/mm/oom_kill.c
+++ b/mm/oom_kill.c
@@ -921,13 +921,7 @@ void oom_kill_process(struct oom_control *oc, struct task_struct *p,
continue;
if (same_thread_group(p, victim))
continue;
- if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD) || is_global_init(p)) {
- /*
- * We cannot use oom_reaper for the mm shared by this
- * process because it wouldn't get killed and so the
- * memory might be still used. Hide the mm from the oom
- * killer to guarantee OOM forward progress.
- */
+ if (is_global_init(p)) {
can_oom_reap = false;
set_bit(MMF_OOM_REAPED, &mm->flags);
pr_info("oom killer %d (%s) has mm pinned by %d (%s)\n",
@@ -935,6 +929,12 @@ void oom_kill_process(struct oom_control *oc, struct task_struct *p,
task_pid_nr(p), p->comm);
continue;
}
+ /*
+ * No use_mm() user needs to read from the userspace so we are
+ * ok to reap it.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+ continue;
do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_FORCED, p, true);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
--
2.8.1
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
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