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Date:	Mon, 13 Jun 2016 13:56:51 +0200
From:	Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
To:	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>
Cc:	Kuthonuzo Luruo <kuthonuzo.luruo@....com>,
	Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, penberg@...nel.org,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, ynorov@...iumnetworks.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/2] mm, kasan: improve double-free detection

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 7:03 PM, Andrey Ryabinin
<aryabinin@...tuozzo.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 06/09/2016 08:00 PM, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>> On 06/07/2016 09:03 PM, Kuthonuzo Luruo wrote:
>>
>> Next time, when/if you send patch series, send patches in one thread, i.e. patches should be replies to the cover letter.
>> Your patches are not linked together, which makes them harder to track.
>>
>>
>>> Currently, KASAN may fail to detect concurrent deallocations of the same
>>> object due to a race in kasan_slab_free(). This patch makes double-free
>>> detection more reliable by serializing access to KASAN object metadata.
>>> New functions kasan_meta_lock() and kasan_meta_unlock() are provided to
>>> lock/unlock per-object metadata. Double-free errors are now reported via
>>> kasan_report().
>>>
>>> Per-object lock concept from suggestion/observations by Dmitry Vyukov.
>>>
>>
>>
>> So, I still don't like this, this too way hacky and complex.
>> I have some thoughts about how to make this lockless and robust enough.
>> I'll try to sort this out tomorrow.
>>
>
>
> So, I something like this should work.
> Tested very briefly.
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index ac4b3c4..8691142 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ struct kasan_cache {
>  int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size);
>  void kasan_free_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm);
>
> +void kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object);
> +
>  size_t ksize(const void *);
>  static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { ksize(ptr); }
>
> @@ -102,6 +104,9 @@ static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
>  static inline void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
>                                         void *object) {}
>
> +static inline void kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> +                               const void *object) { }
> +
>  static inline void kasan_kmalloc_large(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags) {}
>  static inline void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr) {}
>  static inline void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr) {}
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> index 6845f92..ab0fded 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c
> @@ -388,11 +388,9 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t *size,
>         *size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
>
>         /* Add free meta. */
> -       if (cache->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU || cache->ctor ||
> -           cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta)) {
> -               cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
> -               *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
> -       }
> +       cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
> +       *size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
> +
>         redzone_adjust = optimal_redzone(cache->object_size) -
>                 (*size - cache->object_size);
>         if (redzone_adjust > 0)
> @@ -431,13 +429,6 @@ void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
>         kasan_poison_shadow(object,
>                         round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE),
>                         KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> -#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
> -       if (cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN) {
> -               struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info =
> -                       get_alloc_info(cache, object);
> -               alloc_info->state = KASAN_STATE_INIT;
> -       }
> -#endif
>  }
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
> @@ -501,6 +492,20 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *get_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
>         BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) > 32);
>         return (void *)object + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
>  }
> +
> +void kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object)
> +{
> +       struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info;
> +       struct kasan_free_meta *free_info;
> +
> +       if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
> +               return;
> +
> +       alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
> +       free_info = get_free_info(cache, object);
> +       __memset(alloc_info, 0, sizeof(*alloc_info));
> +       __memset(free_info, 0, sizeof(*free_info));
> +}
>  #endif
>
>  void kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
> @@ -523,37 +528,47 @@ static void kasan_poison_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
>  bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
>  {
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
> +       struct kasan_free_meta *free_info = get_free_info(cache, object);
> +       struct kasan_track new_free_stack, old_free_stack;
> +       s8 old_shadow;
> +
>         /* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
>         if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
>                 return false;
>
> -       if (likely(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)) {
> -               struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info =
> -                       get_alloc_info(cache, object);
> -               struct kasan_free_meta *free_info =
> -                       get_free_info(cache, object);
> -
> -               switch (alloc_info->state) {
> -               case KASAN_STATE_ALLOC:
> -                       alloc_info->state = KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE;
> -                       quarantine_put(free_info, cache);
> -                       set_track(&free_info->track, GFP_NOWAIT);
> -                       kasan_poison_slab_free(cache, object);
> -                       return true;
> -               case KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE:
> -               case KASAN_STATE_FREE:
> -                       pr_err("Double free");
> -                       dump_stack();
> -                       break;
> -               default:
> -                       break;
> -               }
> +       if (unlikely(!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN)))
> +               return false;
> +
> +       set_track(&new_free_stack, GFP_NOWAIT);
> +       old_free_stack = xchg(&free_info->track, new_free_stack);
> +       old_shadow = xchg((s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object),
> +                       KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
Indeed, is the use of two xchg operations better than what Kuthonuzo suggests?
On a related note, I wonder whether false sharing becomes a problem
when we perform atomic operations on the shadow (or spin on it, like
in the original suggestion).
> +
> +       if (old_shadow < 0 || old_shadow >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) {
> +               struct kasan_track free_stack;
> +
> +               /* Paired with xchg() above */
> +               free_stack = smp_load_acquire(&free_info->track);
> +
> +               /*
> +                * We didn't raced with another instance of kasan_slab_free()
> +                * so the previous free stack supposed to be in old_free_stack.
> +                * Otherwise, free_stack will contain stack trace of another
> +                * kfree() call.
> +                */
> +               if (free_stack.id == new_free_stack.id)
> +                       free_stack = old_free_stack;
> +
> +               kasan_report_double_free(cache, object,
> +                                       free_stack, old_shadow);
> +               return false;
>         }
> -       return false;
> -#else
>         kasan_poison_slab_free(cache, object);
> -       return false;
> +       return true;
> +
>  #endif
> +       kasan_poison_slab_free(cache, object);
> +       return false;
>  }
>
>  void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
> @@ -581,7 +596,6 @@ void kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object, size_t size,
>                 struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info =
>                         get_alloc_info(cache, object);
>
> -               alloc_info->state = KASAN_STATE_ALLOC;
>                 alloc_info->alloc_size = size;
>                 set_track(&alloc_info->track, flags);
>         }
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index fb87923..9b46d2e 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -59,24 +59,21 @@ struct kasan_global {
>   * Structures to keep alloc and free tracks *
>   */
>
> -enum kasan_state {
> -       KASAN_STATE_INIT,
> -       KASAN_STATE_ALLOC,
> -       KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE,
> -       KASAN_STATE_FREE
> -};
> -
>  #define KASAN_STACK_DEPTH 64
>
>  struct kasan_track {
> -       u32 pid;
> -       depot_stack_handle_t stack;
> +union {
> +       struct {
> +               u32 pid;
> +               depot_stack_handle_t stack;
> +       };
> +       u64 id;
> +};
>  };
>
>  struct kasan_alloc_meta {
>         struct kasan_track track;
> -       u32 state : 2;  /* enum kasan_state */
> -       u32 alloc_size : 30;
> +       u32 alloc_size;
>  };
>
>  struct qlist_node {
> @@ -109,6 +106,9 @@ static inline bool kasan_report_enabled(void)
>
>  void kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
>                 bool is_write, unsigned long ip);
> +void kasan_report_double_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
> +                       struct kasan_track free_stack, s8 shadow);
> +
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
>  void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info, struct kmem_cache *cache);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> index 4973505..3ec039c 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/quarantine.c
> @@ -144,11 +144,9 @@ static void *qlink_to_object(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
>  static void qlink_free(struct qlist_node *qlink, struct kmem_cache *cache)
>  {
>         void *object = qlink_to_object(qlink, cache);
> -       struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_info = get_alloc_info(cache, object);
>         unsigned long flags;
>
>         local_irq_save(flags);
> -       alloc_info->state = KASAN_STATE_FREE;
>         ___cache_free(cache, object, _THIS_IP_);
>         local_irq_restore(flags);
>  }
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
> index b3c122d..a0f4519 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
> @@ -140,28 +140,13 @@ static void object_err(struct kmem_cache *cache, struct page *page,
>         pr_err("Object at %p, in cache %s\n", object, cache->name);
>         if (!(cache->flags & SLAB_KASAN))
>                 return;
> -       switch (alloc_info->state) {
> -       case KASAN_STATE_INIT:
> -               pr_err("Object not allocated yet\n");
> -               break;
> -       case KASAN_STATE_ALLOC:
> -               pr_err("Object allocated with size %u bytes.\n",
> -                      alloc_info->alloc_size);
> -               pr_err("Allocation:\n");
> -               print_track(&alloc_info->track);
> -               break;
> -       case KASAN_STATE_FREE:
> -       case KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE:
> -               pr_err("Object freed, allocated with size %u bytes\n",
> -                      alloc_info->alloc_size);
> -               free_info = get_free_info(cache, object);
> -               pr_err("Allocation:\n");
> -               print_track(&alloc_info->track);
> -               pr_err("Deallocation:\n");
> -               print_track(&free_info->track);
> -               break;
> -       }
> +       free_info = get_free_info(cache, object);
> +       pr_err("Allocation:\n");
> +       print_track(&alloc_info->track);
> +       pr_err("Deallocation:\n");
> +       print_track(&free_info->track);
>  }
> +
>  #endif
>
>  static void print_address_description(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> @@ -245,17 +230,31 @@ static void print_shadow_for_address(const void *addr)
>
>  static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(report_lock);
>
> -static void kasan_report_error(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> +static void kasan_start_report(unsigned long *flags)
>  {
> -       unsigned long flags;
> -       const char *bug_type;
> -
>         /*
>          * Make sure we don't end up in loop.
>          */
>         kasan_disable_current();
> -       spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, flags);
> +       spin_lock_irqsave(&report_lock, *flags);
>         pr_err("==================================================================\n");
> +}
> +
> +static void kasan_end_report(unsigned long *flags)
> +{
> +       pr_err("==================================================================\n");
> +       add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
> +       spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
> +       kasan_enable_current();
> +}
> +
> +static void kasan_report_error(struct kasan_access_info *info)
> +{
> +       unsigned long flags;
> +       const char *bug_type;
> +
> +       kasan_start_report(&flags);
> +
>         if (info->access_addr <
>                         kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START)) {
>                 if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
> @@ -276,10 +275,29 @@ static void kasan_report_error(struct kasan_access_info *info)
>                 print_address_description(info);
>                 print_shadow_for_address(info->first_bad_addr);
>         }
> -       pr_err("==================================================================\n");
> -       add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
> -       spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, flags);
> -       kasan_enable_current();
> +
> +       kasan_end_report(&flags);
> +}
> +
> +void kasan_report_double_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
> +                       struct kasan_track free_stack, s8 shadow)
> +{
> +       unsigned long flags;
> +
> +       kasan_start_report(&flags);
> +
> +       pr_err("BUG: Double free or corrupt pointer\n");
> +       pr_err("Unexpected shadow byte: 0x%hhX\n", shadow);
> +
> +       dump_stack();
> +       pr_err("Object at %p, in cache %s\n", object, cache->name);
> +       get_alloc_info(cache, object);
> +       pr_err("Allocation:\n");
> +       print_track(&get_alloc_info(cache, object)->track);
> +       pr_err("Deallocation:\n");
> +       print_track(&free_stack);
> +
> +       kasan_end_report(&flags);
>  }
>
>  void kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size,
> diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
> index 763096a..65c942b 100644
> --- a/mm/slab.c
> +++ b/mm/slab.c
> @@ -2604,9 +2604,11 @@ static void cache_init_objs(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
>         }
>
>         for (i = 0; i < cachep->num; i++) {
> +               objp = index_to_obj(cachep, page, i);
> +               kasan_init_slab_obj(cachep, objp);
> +
>                 /* constructor could break poison info */
>                 if (DEBUG == 0 && cachep->ctor) {
> -                       objp = index_to_obj(cachep, page, i);
>                         kasan_unpoison_object_data(cachep, objp);
>                         cachep->ctor(objp);
>                         kasan_poison_object_data(cachep, objp);



-- 
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
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80636 München

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