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Message-Id: <1465832919-11316-3-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2016 11:48:34 -0400
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
To: Linux Kernel Developers List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, smueller@...onox.de,
herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, andi@...stfloor.org,
sandyinchina@...il.com, jsd@...n.com, hpa@...or.com,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, stable@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/7] random: print a warning for the first ten uninitialized random users
Since systemd is consistently using /dev/urandom before it is
initialized, we can't see the other potentially dangerous users of
/dev/urandom immediately after boot. So print the first ten such
complaints instead.
Cc: stable@...nel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 4e2627a..74596d3 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1458,12 +1458,16 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
static ssize_t
urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ static int maxwarn = 10;
int ret;
- if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0))
- printk_once(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s urandom read "
- "with %d bits of entropy available\n",
- current->comm, nonblocking_pool.entropy_total);
+ if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0) &&
+ maxwarn > 0) {
+ maxwarn--;
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized urandom read "
+ "(%d bytes read, %d bits of entropy available)\n",
+ current->comm, nbytes, nonblocking_pool.entropy_total);
+ }
nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
ret = extract_entropy_user(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
--
2.5.0
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