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Message-ID: <1759070.fi90mrsgKn@positron.chronox.de>
Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2016 07:12:24 +0200
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: Andrew Zaborowski <balrogg@...glemail.com>
Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>,
Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@...el.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, marcel@...tmann.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>, davem@...emloft.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 3/6] crypto: AF_ALG -- add asymmetric cipher interface
Am Dienstag, 14. Juni 2016, 00:16:11 schrieb Andrew Zaborowski:
Hi Andrew,
> Hi,
>
> On 8 June 2016 at 21:14, Mat Martineau
>
> <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, 8 Jun 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> >> What is your concern?
> >
> > Userspace must allocate larger buffers than it knows are necessary for
> > expected results.
> >
> > It looks like the software rsa implementation handles shorter output
> > buffers ok (mpi_write_to_sgl will return EOVERFLOW if the the buffer is
> > too small), however I see at least one hardware rsa driver that requires
> > the output buffer to be the maximum size. But this inconsistency might be
> > best addressed within the software cipher or drivers rather than in
> > recvmsg.
> Should the hardware drivers fix this instead? I've looked at the qat
> and caam drivers, they both require the destination buffer size to be
> the key size and in both cases there would be no penalty for dropping
> this requirement as far as I see. Both do a memmove if the result
> ends up being shorter than key size. In case the caller knows it is
> expecting a specific output size, the driver will have to use a self
> allocated buffer + a memcpy in those same cases where it would later
> use memmove instead. Alternatively the sg passed to dma_map_sg can be
> prepended with a dummy segment the right size to save the memcpy.
>
> akcipher.h only says:
> @dst_len: Size of the output buffer. It needs to be at least as big as
> the expected result depending on the operation
>
> Note that for random input data the memmove will be done about 1 in
> 256 times but with PKCS#1 padding the signature always has a leading
> zero.
>
> Requiring buffers bigger than needed makes the added work of dropping
> the zero bytes from the sglist and potentially re-adding them in the
> client difficult to justify. RSA doing this sets a precedent for a
> future pkcs1pad (or other algorithm) implementation to do the same
> thing and a portable client having to always know the key size and use
> key-sized buffers.
I think we have agreed on dropping the length enforcement at the interface
level.
Ciao
Stephan
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