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Message-ID: <3213943.8fHWQDGiN1@tauon.atsec.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2016 07:17:43 +0200
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@...encehorizons.net>, andi@...stfloor.org,
cryptography@...edaemon.net, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
hpa@...ux.intel.com, joe@...ches.com, jsd@...n.com,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux@...izon.com, pavel@....cz, sandyinchina@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/7] /dev/random - a new approach
Am Dienstag, 21. Juni 2016, 01:12:55 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:
Hi Theodore,
> On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 09:00:49PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > The time stamp maintenance is the exact cause for the correlation: one HID
> > event triggers:
> >
> > - add_interrupt_randomness which takes high-res time stamp, Jiffies and
> > some pointers
> >
> > - add_input_randomness which takes high-res time stamp, Jiffies and HID
> > event value
> >
> > The same applies to disk events. My suggestion is to get rid of the double
> > counting of time stamps for one event.
> >
> > And I guess I do not need to stress that correlation of data that is
> > supposed to be entropic is not good :-)
>
> What is your concern, specifically? If it is in the entropy
> accounting, there is more entropy in HID event interrupts, so I don't
> think adding the extra 1/64th bit of entropy is going to be problematic.
My concern is that interrupts have *much* more entropy than 1/64th. With a
revaluation of the assumed entropy in interrupts, we will serve *all* systems
much better and not just systems with HID.
As said, I think we heavily penalize server type and VM environments against
desktop systems by crediting entropy in large scale to HID and conversely to a
much lesser degree to interrupts.
>
> If it is that there are two timestamps that are closely correleated
> being added into the pool, the add_interrupt_randomness() path is
> going to mix that timestamp with the interrupt timings from 63 other
> interrupts before it is mixed into the input pool, while the
> add_input_randomness() mixes it directly into the pool. So if you
> think there is a way this could be leveraged into attack, please give
> specifics --- but I think we're on pretty solid ground here.
I am not saying that there is an active attack vector. All I want is to
revalue the entropy in one interrupt which can only be done if we drop the HID
time stamp collection.
Ciao
Stephan
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