[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <1467088360-10186-3-git-send-email-bsd@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2016 00:32:37 -0400
From: Bandan Das <bsd@...hat.com>
To: kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@...hat.com, guangrong.xiao@...ux.intel.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] mmu: pass execonly value when initializing rsvd bits
In reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask, we always pass false
when initializing the reserved bits. By initializing with the
correct value of ept exec only, the host can correctly
identify if the guest pte is valid. Note that
kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu() already knows about execonly.
Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@...hat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index a50af79..875d4f7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -3831,23 +3831,27 @@ static inline bool boot_cpu_is_amd(void)
/*
* the direct page table on host, use as much mmu features as
- * possible, however, kvm currently does not do execution-protection.
+ * possible
*/
static void
reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *context)
{
+ bool execonly;
+
if (boot_cpu_is_amd())
__reset_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, &context->shadow_zero_check,
boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
context->shadow_root_level, false,
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES),
true, true);
- else
+ else {
+ execonly = !(context->guest_rsvd_check.bad_mt_xwr &
+ (1ull << VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK));
__reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(&context->shadow_zero_check,
boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits,
- false);
-
+ execonly);
+ }
}
/*
--
2.5.5
Powered by blists - more mailing lists