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Message-ID: <20160709104340.GA9637@unicorn.suse.cz>
Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2016 12:43:40 +0200
From: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@...e.cz>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
samanthakumar <samanthakumar@...gle.com>,
Marco Grassi <marco.gra@...il.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] udp: prevent bugcheck if filter truncates packet too
much
On Sat, Jul 09, 2016 at 11:48:49AM +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 07/09/2016 02:20 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> >On Sat, Jul 09, 2016 at 01:31:40AM +0200, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> >>On Fri, 2016-07-08 at 17:52 +0200, Michal Kubecek wrote:
> >>>If socket filter truncates an udp packet below the length of UDP header
> >>>in udpv6_queue_rcv_skb() or udp_queue_rcv_skb(), it will trigger a
> >>>BUG_ON in skb_pull_rcsum(). This BUG_ON (and therefore a system crash if
> >>>kernel is configured that way) can be easily enforced by an unprivileged
> >>>user which was reported as CVE-2016-6162. For a reproducer, see
> >>>http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q3/8
> >>>
> >>>Fixes: e6afc8ace6dd ("udp: remove headers from UDP packets before queueing")
> >>>Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@...il.com>
> >>>Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@...e.cz>
> >>>---
> >>> net/ipv4/udp.c | 2 ++
> >>> net/ipv6/udp.c | 2 ++
> >>> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
> >>>
> >>>diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
> >>>index ca5e8ea29538..4aed8fc23d32 100644
> >>>--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
> >>>+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
> >>>@@ -1583,6 +1583,8 @@ int udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> >>>
> >>> if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
> >>> goto drop;
> >>>+ if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof(struct udphdr)))
> >>>+ goto drop;
> >>>
> >>> udp_csum_pull_header(skb);
> >>> if (sk_rcvqueues_full(sk, sk->sk_rcvbuf)) {
> >>>diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
> >>>index 005dc82c2138..acc09705618b 100644
> >>>--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
> >>>+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
> >>>@@ -620,6 +620,8 @@ int udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> >>>
> >>> if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
> >>> goto drop;
> >>>+ if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof(struct udphdr)))
> >>>+ goto drop;
> >>>
> >>> udp_csum_pull_header(skb);
> >>> if (sk_rcvqueues_full(sk, sk->sk_rcvbuf)) {
> >>
> >>
> >>Arg :(
> >>
> >>Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
> >
> >this is incomplete fix. Please do not apply. See discussion at security@...nel
>
> Ohh well, didn't see it earlier before starting the discussion at security@...
>
> I'm okay if we take this for now as a quick band aid and find a better
> way how to deal with the underlying issue long-term so that it's
> /guaranteed/ that it doesn't bite us any further in such fragile ways.
Agreed. As rc7 is due in a day or two, rushing a complex and intrusive
solution in might be too risky.
Michal Kubecek
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