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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+QgR23P_jMahXJEm3gyRo90YMk_mifg8sg8cnrRaYWtA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 11:52:02 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Oren Laadan <orenl@...lrox.com>,
Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@...gle.com>,
Rom Lemarchand <romlem@...roid.com>,
Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>, Colin Cross <ccross@...roid.com>,
Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@...gle.com>,
Elliott Hughes <enh@...gle.com>,
Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@...roid.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] proc: Relax /proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns capability requirements
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 11:50 AM, John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org> wrote:
> When an interface to allow a task to change another tasks
> timerslack was first proposed, it was suggested that something
> greater then CAP_SYS_NICE would be needed, as a task could be
> delayed further then what normally could be done with nice
> adjustments.
>
> So CAP_SYS_PTRACE was adopted instead for what became the
> /proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns interface. However, for Android (where
> this feature originates), giving the system_server
> CAP_SYS_PTRACE would allow it to observe and modify all tasks
> memory. This is considered too high a privilege level for only
> needing to change the timerslack.
>
> After some discussion, it was realized that a CAP_SYS_NICE
> process can set a task as SCHED_FIFO, so they could fork some
> spinning processes and set them all SCHED_FIFO 99, in effect
> delaying all other tasks for an infinite amount of time.
>
> So as a CAP_SYS_NICE task can already cause trouble for other
> tasks, using it as a required capability for accessing and
> modifying /proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns seems sufficient.
>
> Thus, this patch loosens the capability requirements to
> CAP_SYS_NICE.
>
> For ABI preservation, it still allows CAP_SYS_PTRACE tasks to
> access/modify timerslack values, but I'm fine with removing
> this if others agree.
Is anything actually using this ABI yet? (Regardless, I'm fine
allowing both caps.)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
-Kees
>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@...lrox.com>
> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@...gle.com>
> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@...roid.com>
> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>
> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@...roid.com>
> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@...gle.com>
> Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@...gle.com>
> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@...roid.com>
> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++++--
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index a11eb71..d32033e 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2281,7 +2281,8 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> if (!p)
> return -ESRCH;
>
> - if (ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) {
> + if (ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) ||
> + capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> task_lock(p);
> if (slack_ns == 0)
> p->timer_slack_ns = p->default_timer_slack_ns;
> @@ -2306,7 +2307,8 @@ static int timerslack_ns_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> if (!p)
> return -ESRCH;
>
> - if (ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) {
> + if (ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) ||
> + capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> task_lock(p);
> seq_printf(m, "%llu\n", p->timer_slack_ns);
> task_unlock(p);
> --
> 1.9.1
>
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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