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Message-ID: <CAFJ0LnGaKDEozyZnfrdC9a+c83UWhTg2Vrw0Xe+=eb2CO=h4yg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 12:55:13 -0700
From: Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>
To: John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
Oren Laadan <orenl@...lrox.com>,
Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@...gle.com>,
Rom Lemarchand <romlem@...roid.com>,
Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>, Colin Cross <ccross@...roid.com>,
Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@...gle.com>,
Elliott Hughes <enh@...gle.com>,
Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@...roid.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
SELinux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/2 v2] proc: Relax /proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns
capability requirements
On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 10:24 AM, John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org> wrote:
> When an interface to allow a task to change another tasks
> timerslack was first proposed, it was suggested that something
> greater then CAP_SYS_NICE would be needed, as a task could be
> delayed further then what normally could be done with nice
> adjustments.
>
> So CAP_SYS_PTRACE was adopted instead for what became the
> /proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns interface. However, for Android (where
> this feature originates), giving the system_server
> CAP_SYS_PTRACE would allow it to observe and modify all tasks
> memory. This is considered too high a privilege level for only
> needing to change the timerslack.
>
> After some discussion, it was realized that a CAP_SYS_NICE
> process can set a task as SCHED_FIFO, so they could fork some
> spinning processes and set them all SCHED_FIFO 99, in effect
> delaying all other tasks for an infinite amount of time.
>
> So as a CAP_SYS_NICE task can already cause trouble for other
> tasks, using it as a required capability for accessing and
> modifying /proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns seems sufficient.
>
> Thus, this patch loosens the capability requirements to
> CAP_SYS_NICE and removes CAP_SYS_PTRACE, simplifying some
> of the code flow as well.
>
> This is technically an ABI change, but as the feature just
> landed in 4.6, I suspect no one is yet using it.
>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@...lrox.com>
> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@...gle.com>
> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@...roid.com>
> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@...gle.com>
> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@...roid.com>
> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@...gle.com>
> Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@...gle.com>
> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@...roid.com>
> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>
> ---
> v2: Removed CAP_SYS_PTRACE check and simplified code flow
>
> fs/proc/base.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++-----------------
> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index a11eb71..8f4f8d7 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2277,19 +2277,19 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> if (err < 0)
> return err;
>
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> p = get_proc_task(inode);
> if (!p)
> return -ESRCH;
The capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) permission check should be moved to this
point, since it doesn't make sense to return EPERM if the task
structure doesn't exist.
>
> - if (ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) {
> - task_lock(p);
> - if (slack_ns == 0)
> - p->timer_slack_ns = p->default_timer_slack_ns;
> - else
> - p->timer_slack_ns = slack_ns;
> - task_unlock(p);
> - } else
> - count = -EPERM;
> + task_lock(p);
> + if (slack_ns == 0)
> + p->timer_slack_ns = p->default_timer_slack_ns;
> + else
> + p->timer_slack_ns = slack_ns;
> + task_unlock(p);
>
> put_task_struct(p);
>
> @@ -2300,22 +2300,21 @@ static int timerslack_ns_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> {
> struct inode *inode = m->private;
> struct task_struct *p;
> - int err = 0;
> +
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
> + return -EPERM;
This should also have a similar LSM check for reads. For the SELinux
implementation, this can map to the PROCESS__GETSCHED permission.
security/selinux/hooks.c:
static int selinux_task_gettimerslack(struct task_struct *p)
{
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
}
>
> p = get_proc_task(inode);
> if (!p)
> return -ESRCH;
As above, recommend moving the capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) check to this point.
>
> - if (ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) {
> - task_lock(p);
> - seq_printf(m, "%llu\n", p->timer_slack_ns);
> - task_unlock(p);
> - } else
> - err = -EPERM;
> + task_lock(p);
> + seq_printf(m, "%llu\n", p->timer_slack_ns);
> + task_unlock(p);
>
> put_task_struct(p);
>
> - return err;
> + return 0;
> }
>
> static int timerslack_ns_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
> --
> 1.9.1
>
--
Nick Kralevich | Android Security | nnk@...gle.com | 650.214.4037
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