linux-kernel - Re: [RFC 0/3] extend kexec_file

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Message-Id: <2545578.SWp0m9VQX8@hactar>
Date:	Wed, 20 Jul 2016 12:50:11 -0300
From:	Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Cc:	Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
	Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
	Stewart Smith <stewart@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, bhe@...hat.com,
	kexec@...ts.infradead.org, dyoung@...hat.com,
	Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@...e.cz>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/3] extend kexec_file_load system call

Am Mittwoch, 20 Juli 2016, 13:12:20 schrieb Arnd Bergmann:
> On Wednesday, July 20, 2016 8:47:45 PM CEST Michael Ellerman wrote:
> > At least for stdout-path, I can't really see how that would
> > significantly help an attacker, but I'm all ears if anyone has ideas.
> 
> That's actually an easy one that came up before: If an attacker controls
> a tty device (e.g. network console) that can be used to enter a debugger
> (kdb, kgdb, xmon, ...), enabling that to be the console device
> gives you a direct attack vector. The same thing will happen if you
> have a piece of software that intentially gives extra rights to the
> owner of the console device by treating it as "physical presence".

I think people are talking past each other a bit in these arguments about 
what is relevant to security or not.

For the kexec maintainers, kexec_file_load has one very specific and narrow 
purpose: enable Secure Boot as defined by UEFI.

And from what I understand of their arguments so far, there is one and only 
one security concern: when in Secure Boot mode, a system must not allow 
execution of unsigned code with kernel privileges. So even if one can 
specify a different root filesystem and do a lot of nasty things to the 
system with a rogue userspace in that root filesystem, as long as the kernel 
won't load unsigned modules that's not a problem as far as they're 
concerned.

Also, AFAIK attacks requiring "physical presence" are out of scope for the 
UEFI Secure Boot security model. Thus an attack that involves control of a 
console of plugging an USB device is also not a concern.

One thing I don't know is whether an attack involving a networked IPMI 
console or a USB device that can be "plugged" virtually by a managing system 
(BMC) is considered a physical attack or a remote attack in the context of 
UEFI Secure Boot.

-- 
[]'s
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center