linux-kernel - linux-next: manual merge of the kspp tree with the arm64 tree

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20160721123426.3648a307@canb.auug.org.au>
Date:	Thu, 21 Jul 2016 12:34:26 +1000
From:	Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>
To:	Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc:	linux-next@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Yang Shi <yang.shi@...aro.org>
Subject: linux-next: manual merge of the kspp tree with the arm64 tree

Hi Kees,

Today's linux-next merge of the kspp tree got a conflict in:

  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h

between commit:

  bffe1baff5d5 ("arm64: kasan: instrument user memory access API")

from the arm64 tree and commit:

  aac380fe78b1 ("arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy")

from the kspp tree.

I fixed it up (see below) and can carry the fix as necessary. This
is now fixed as far as linux-next is concerned, but any non trivial
conflicts should be mentioned to your upstream maintainer when your tree
is submitted for merging.  You may also want to consider cooperating
with the maintainer of the conflicting tree to minimise any particularly
complex conflicts.

-- 
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell

diff --cc arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 5e834d10b291,c3d445b42351..000000000000
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@@ -264,33 -276,32 +264,38 @@@ extern unsigned long __must_check __cle
  
  static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
  {
 +	kasan_check_write(to, n);
- 	return  __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+ 	check_object_size(to, n, false);
+ 	return __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
  }
  
  static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
  {
 +	kasan_check_read(from, n);
- 	return  __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+ 	check_object_size(from, n, true);
+ 	return __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
  }
  
  static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
  {
 +	kasan_check_write(to, n);
 +
- 	if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
+ 	if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n)) {
+ 		check_object_size(to, n, false);
  		n = __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
- 	else /* security hole - plug it */
+ 	} else /* security hole - plug it */
  		memset(to, 0, n);
  	return n;
  }
  
  static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
  {
 +	kasan_check_read(from, n);
 +
- 	if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
+ 	if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) {
+ 		check_object_size(from, n, true);
  		n = __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
+ 	}
  	return n;
  }