linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 10/19] x86/dumpstack: add get_stack

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Message-ID: <CAMzpN2ivhVynevNrbMarccWEa7=PbRsrbJ=weeFdCez2A5A8fw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Tue, 26 Jul 2016 13:49:06 -0400
From:	Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
To:	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc:	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
	Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/19] x86/dumpstack: add get_stack_info() interface

On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 12:47 PM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 25, 2016 at 05:09:44PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Sat, Jul 23, 2016 at 7:04 AM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com> wrote:
>> > Am I correct in understanding that there can only be one level of NMI
>> > nesting at any given time?  If so, could we make it easier on the
>> > unwinder by putting the nested NMI on a separate software stack, so the
>> > "next stack" pointers are always in the same place?  Or am I just being
>> > naive?
>>
>> I think you're being naive :)
>
> Another dumb question: since NMIs are reentrant, have you considered
> removing the NMI IST entry, and instead just have NMIs keep using the
> current stack?
>
> The first NMI could then be switched to an NMI software stack, like IRQs
> (assuming there's a way to do that atomically!).  And then determining
> the context of subsequent NMIs would be straightforward, and we'd no
> longer need to jump through all those horrible hoops in the entry code
> to deal with NMI nesting.
>
> Now you can tell me what else I'm missing...

There are several places (most notably SYSCALL entry) where the kernel
stack pointer is unsafe/user controlled for a brief time.  Since an
NMI can interrupt anywhere in the kernel, you have to use an IST to
protect against that case.

Blame Intel's legacy behavior for this mess, because IRET
unconditionally re-enables NMIs even if you are returning from another
exception like a page fault.  This wasn't a problem on the 8086 which
didn't have an MMU, but makes makes no sense on modern systems.

--
Brian Gerst