linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH] [RFC] Introduce mmap randomization

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Message-ID: <476DC76E7D1DF2438D32BFADF679FC5601260044@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com>
Date:	Tue, 26 Jul 2016 21:02:48 +0000
From:	"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>
To:	Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>
CC:	"jason@...edaemon.net" <jason@...edaemon.net>,
	"linux-mm@...r.kernel.org" <linux-mm@...r.kernel.org>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
	"salyzyn@...roid.com" <salyzyn@...roid.com>,
	"Daniel Cashman" <dcashman@...roid.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH] [RFC] Introduce mmap randomization



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Nick Kralevich [mailto:nnk@...gle.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2016 1:41 PM
> To: Roberts, William C <william.c.roberts@...el.com>
> Cc: jason@...edaemon.net; linux-mm@...r.kernel.org; lkml <linux-
> kernel@...r.kernel.org>; kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com; Andrew
> Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>; Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>;
> Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>; Jeffrey Vander Stoep
> <jeffv@...gle.com>; salyzyn@...roid.com; Daniel Cashman
> <dcashman@...roid.com>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Introduce mmap randomization
> 
> My apologies in advance if I misunderstand the purposes of this patch.
> 
> IIUC, this patch adds a random gap between various mmap() mappings, with the
> goal of ensuring that both the mmap base address and gaps between pages are
> randomized.
> 
> If that's the goal, please note that this behavior has caused significant
> performance problems to Android in the past. Specifically, random gaps between
> mmap()ed regions causes memory space fragmentation. After a program runs for
> a long time, the ability to find large contiguous blocks of memory becomes
> impossible, and mmap()s fail due to lack of a large enough address space.

Yes and fragmentation is definitely a problem here. Especially when the mmaps()
are not a consistent length for program life.

> 
> This isn't just a theoretical concern. Android actually hit this on kernels prior to
> http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=7dbaa46
> 6780a754154531b44c2086f6618cee3a8
> . Before that patch, the gaps between mmap()ed pages were randomized.
> See the discussion at:
> 
>   http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2011-
> November/073082.html
>   http://marc.info/?t=132070957400005&r=1&w=2
> 
> We ended up having to work around this problem in the following commits:
> 
> 
> https://android.googlesource.com/platform/dalvik/+/311886c6c6fcd3b531531f59
> 2d56caab5e2a259c
>   https://android.googlesource.com/platform/art/+/51e5386
>   https://android.googlesource.com/platform/art/+/f94b781
> 
> If this behavior was re-introduced, it's likely to cause hard-to-reproduce
> problems, and I suspect Android based distributions would tend to disable this
> feature either globally, or for applications which make a large number of mmap()
> calls.

Yeah and this is the issue I want to see if we can overcome. I see the biggest benefit
being on libraries loaded by dl. Perhaps a random flag and modify to linkers. Im just
spit balling here and collecting the feedback, like this. Thanks for the detail, that
helps a lot.

> 
> -- Nick
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 at 11:22 AM,  <william.c.roberts@...el.com> wrote:
> > From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@...el.com>
> >
> > This patch introduces the ability randomize mmap locations where the
> > address is not requested, for instance when ld is allocating pages for
> > shared libraries. It chooses to randomize based on the current
> > personality for ASLR.
> >
> > Currently, allocations are done sequentially within unmapped address
> > space gaps. This may happen top down or bottom up depending on scheme.
> >
> > For instance these mmap calls produce contiguous mappings:
> > int size = getpagesize();
> > mmap(NULL, size, flags, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) =
> 0x40026000
> > mmap(NULL, size, flags, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) =
> 0x40027000
> >
> > Note no gap between.
> >
> > After patches:
> > int size = getpagesize();
> > mmap(NULL, size, flags, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) =
> 0x400b4000
> > mmap(NULL, size, flags, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) =
> 0x40055000
> >
> > Note gap between.
> >
> > Using the test program mentioned here, that allocates fixed sized
> > blocks till exhaustion:
> > https://www.linux-mips.org/archives/linux-mips/2011-05/msg00252.html,
> > no difference was noticed in the number of allocations. Most varied
> > from run to run, but were always within a few allocations of one
> > another between patched and un-patched runs.
> >
> > Performance Measurements:
> > Using strace with -T option and filtering for mmap on the program ls
> > shows a slowdown of approximate 3.7%
> >
> > Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@...el.com>
> > ---
> >  mm/mmap.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> > index de2c176..7891272 100644
> > --- a/mm/mmap.c
> > +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> > @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
> >  #include <linux/userfaultfd_k.h>
> >  #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
> >  #include <linux/pkeys.h>
> > +#include <linux/random.h>
> >
> >  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
> >  #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
> > @@ -1582,6 +1583,24 @@ unacct_error:
> >         return error;
> >  }
> >
> > +/*
> > + * Generate a random address within a range. This differs from
> > +randomize_addr() by randomizing
> > + * on len sized chunks. This helps prevent fragmentation of the virtual
> memory map.
> > + */
> > +static unsigned long randomize_mmap(unsigned long start, unsigned
> > +long end, unsigned long len) {
> > +       unsigned long slots;
> > +
> > +       if ((current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) ||
> !randomize_va_space)
> > +               return 0;
> > +
> > +       slots = (end - start)/len;
> > +       if (!slots)
> > +               return 0;
> > +
> > +       return PAGE_ALIGN(start + ((get_random_long() % slots) *
> > +len)); }
> > +
> >  unsigned long unmapped_area(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)  {
> >         /*
> > @@ -1676,6 +1695,8 @@ found:
> >         if (gap_start < info->low_limit)
> >                 gap_start = info->low_limit;
> >
> > +       gap_start = randomize_mmap(gap_start, gap_end, length) ? :
> > + gap_start;
> > +
> >         /* Adjust gap address to the desired alignment */
> >         gap_start += (info->align_offset - gap_start) &
> > info->align_mask;
> >
> > @@ -1775,6 +1796,9 @@ found:
> >  found_highest:
> >         /* Compute highest gap address at the desired alignment */
> >         gap_end -= info->length;
> > +
> > +       gap_end = randomize_mmap(gap_start, gap_end, length) ? :
> > + gap_end;
> > +
> >         gap_end -= (gap_end - info->align_offset) & info->align_mask;
> >
> >         VM_BUG_ON(gap_end < info->low_limit);
> > --
> > 1.9.1
> >
> 
> 
> 
> --
> Nick Kralevich | Android Security | nnk@...gle.com | 650.214.4037