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Message-ID: <1470228801.19955.38.camel@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 03 Aug 2016 08:53:21 -0400
From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow
further restriction of perf_event_open
Having this in Yama would also make it probable that there would be a
security-centric default. It would end up wiping out unprivileged perf
events access on distributions using Yama for ptrace_scope unless they
make the explicit decision to disable it. Having the perf subsystem
extend the existing perf_event_paranoid sysctl leaves the control over
the upstream default in the hands of the perf subsystem, not LSMs.
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