Date:	Thu, 4 Aug 2016 03:12:00 -0700
From:	Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>
To:	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, alexei.starovoitov@...il.com,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/4] RFC: Add Checmate, BPF-driven minor LSM

On Thu, Aug 04, 2016 at 11:45:08AM +0200, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> Hi Sargun,
> 
> On 08/04/2016 09:11 AM, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> [...]
> >[It's a] minor LSM. My particular use case is one in which containers are being
> >dynamically deployed to machines by internal developers in a different group.
> [...]
> >For many of these containers, the security policies can be fairly nuanced. One
> >particular one to take into account is network security. Often times,
> >administrators want to prevent ingress, and egress connectivity except from a
> >few select IPs. Egress filtering can be managed using net_cls, but without
> >modifying running software, it's non-trivial to attach a filter to all sockets
> >being created within a container. The inet_conn_request, socket_recvmsg,
> >socket_sock_rcv_skb hooks make this trivial to implement.
> 
> I'm not too familiar with LSMs, but afaik, when you install such policies they
> are effectively global, right? How would you install/manage such policies per
> container?
> 
> On a quick glance, this would then be the job of the BPF proglet from the global
> hook, no? If yes, then the BPF contexts the BPF prog works with seem rather quite
> limited ...
You're right. They are global hooks. If you'd want the policy to be specific to 
a given cgroup, or namespace, you'd have to introduce a level of indirection 
through a prog_array, or some such. There are still cases (the CVE, and Docker 
bind) case where you want global isolation. The other big aspect is being able 
to implement application-specific LSMs without requiring kmods. (A la hardchroot).

> 
> +struct checmate_file_open_ctx {
> +	struct file *file;
> +	const struct cred *cred;
> +};
> +
> +struct checmate_task_create_ctx {
> +	unsigned long clone_flags;
> +};
> +
> +struct checmate_task_free_ctx {
> +	struct task_struct *task;
> +};
> +
> +struct checmate_socket_connect_ctx {
> +	struct socket *sock;
> +	struct sockaddr *address;
> +	int addrlen;
> +};
> 
> ... or are you using bpf_probe_read() in some way to walk 'current' to retrieve
> a namespace from there somehow? Like via nsproxy? But how you make sense of this
> for defining a per container policy?
In my prototype code, I'm using uts namespace + hostname, and I'm extracting 
that via the bpf_probe_read walk. You're right, that's less than awesome. In the 
longer-term, I'd hope we'd be able to add a helper like bpf_current_in_cgroup (a 
la bpf_skb_in_cgroup). The idea is that we'd add enough helpers to avoid this. I 
can submit some more example BPF programs if that'd help.  Off the top of my 
head:

* current_in_cgroup 
* introduce struct pid map 
* introduce helpers to inspect common datatypes passed to the helper -- if you 
  look at something like the the net hooks, there aren't actually that many
  datatypes being passed around
* Introduce an example top-level cgroup that maps cgroup -> tail_call into
  other programs

> 
> Do you see a way where we don't need to define so many different ctx each time?
> 
> My other concern from a security PoV is that when using things like bpf_probe_read()
> we're dependent on kernel structs and there's a risk that when people migrate such
> policies that expectations break due to underlying structs changed. I see you've
> addressed that in patch 4 to place a small stone in the way, yeah kinda works. It's
> mostly a reminder that this is not stable ABI.
> 
> Thanks,
> Daniel

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