linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.16 284/305] s390/sclp_ctl: fix potential information leak with /dev/sclp

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Date:	Sat, 13 Aug 2016 18:42:51 +0100
From:	Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:	akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
	"Michael Holzheu" <holzheu@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	"Martin Schwidefsky" <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>,
	"Pengfei Wang" <wpengfeinudt@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 284/305] s390/sclp_ctl: fix potential information
 leak with /dev/sclp

3.16.37-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>

commit 532c34b5fbf1687df63b3fcd5b2846312ac943c6 upstream.

The sclp_ctl_ioctl_sccb function uses two copy_from_user calls to
retrieve the sclp request from user space. The first copy_from_user
fetches the length of the request which is stored in the first two
bytes of the request. The second copy_from_user gets the complete
sclp request, but this copies the length field a second time.
A malicious user may have changed the length in the meantime.

Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@...il.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 drivers/s390/char/sclp_ctl.c | 12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/s390/char/sclp_ctl.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/char/sclp_ctl.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ static int sclp_ctl_ioctl_sccb(void __us
 {
 	struct sclp_ctl_sccb ctl_sccb;
 	struct sccb_header *sccb;
+	unsigned long copied;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&ctl_sccb, user_area, sizeof(ctl_sccb)))
@@ -65,14 +66,15 @@ static int sclp_ctl_ioctl_sccb(void __us
 	sccb = (void *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
 	if (!sccb)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	if (copy_from_user(sccb, u64_to_uptr(ctl_sccb.sccb), sizeof(*sccb))) {
+	copied = PAGE_SIZE -
+		copy_from_user(sccb, u64_to_uptr(ctl_sccb.sccb), PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (offsetof(struct sccb_header, length) +
+	    sizeof(sccb->length) > copied || sccb->length > copied) {
 		rc = -EFAULT;
 		goto out_free;
 	}
-	if (sccb->length > PAGE_SIZE || sccb->length < 8)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	if (copy_from_user(sccb, u64_to_uptr(ctl_sccb.sccb), sccb->length)) {
-		rc = -EFAULT;
+	if (sccb->length < 8) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	rc = sclp_sync_request(ctl_sccb.cmdw, sccb);