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Message-Id: <20160817000133.GZ3482@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 17:01:33 -0700
From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@...eaurora.org>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>,
Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Josef Bacik <jbacik@...com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@...ulusnetworks.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] bug: Provide toggle for BUG on data corruption
On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 02:42:28PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 2:26 PM, Paul E. McKenney
> <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 02:11:04PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> The kernel checks for several cases of data structure corruption under
> >> either normal runtime, or under various CONFIG_DEBUG_* settings. When
> >> corruption is detected, some systems may want to BUG() immediately instead
> >> of letting the corruption continue. Many of these manipulation primitives
> >> can be used by security flaws to gain arbitrary memory write control. This
> >> provides CONFIG_BUG_ON_CORRUPTION to control newly added BUG() locations.
> >>
> >> This is inspired by similar hardening in PaX and Grsecurity, and by
> >> Stephen Boyd in MSM kernels.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> >
> > OK, I will bite... Why both the WARN() and the BUG_ON()?
>
> Mostly because not every case of BUG(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE) is
> cleanly paired with a WARN (see the workqueue addition that wants to
> dump locks too). I could rearrange things a bit, though, and create
> something like:
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_CORRUPTION
> # define CORRUPTED(format...) { \
> printk(KERN_ERR format); \
> BUG(); \
> }
> #else
> # define CORRUPTED(format...) WARN(1, format)
> #endif
>
> What do you think?
First let me see if I understand the rationale... The idea is to allow
those in security-irrelevant environments, such as test systems, to
have the old "complain but soldier on" semantics, while security-conscious
systems just panic, thereby hopefully converting a more dangerous form
of attack into a denial-of-service attack.
An alternative approach would be to make WARN() panic on systems built
with CONFIG_BUG_ON_CORRUPTION, but we might instead want to choose which
warnings are fatal on security-conscious systems.
Or am I missing the point?
At a more detailed level, one could argue for something like this:
#define CORRUPTED(format...) \
do { \
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BUG_ON_CORRUPTION)) { \
printk(KERN_ERR format); \
BUG(); \
} else { \
WARN(1, format); \
} \
} while (0)
Some might prefer #ifdef to IS_ENABLED(), but the bare {} needs to
be do-while in any case.
Thanx, Paul
> -Kees
>
> >
> > Thanx, Paul
> >
> >> ---
> >> include/linux/bug.h | 7 +++++++
> >> kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c | 1 +
> >> kernel/workqueue.c | 2 ++
> >> lib/Kconfig.debug | 10 ++++++++++
> >> lib/list_debug.c | 7 +++++++
> >> 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/bug.h b/include/linux/bug.h
> >> index e51b0709e78d..7e69758dd798 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/bug.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/bug.h
> >> @@ -118,4 +118,11 @@ static inline enum bug_trap_type report_bug(unsigned long bug_addr,
> >> }
> >>
> >> #endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
> >> +
> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_CORRUPTION
> >> +# define CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE true
> >> +#else
> >> +# define CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE false
> >> +#endif
> >> +
> >> #endif /* _LINUX_BUG_H */
> >> diff --git a/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c b/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c
> >> index 0374a596cffa..d5f833769feb 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c
> >> @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ static void spin_dump(raw_spinlock_t *lock, const char *msg)
> >> owner ? owner->comm : "<none>",
> >> owner ? task_pid_nr(owner) : -1,
> >> lock->owner_cpu);
> >> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
> >> dump_stack();
> >> }
> >>
> >> diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c
> >> index ef071ca73fc3..ea0132b55eca 100644
> >> --- a/kernel/workqueue.c
> >> +++ b/kernel/workqueue.c
> >> @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
> >> #include <linux/nodemask.h>
> >> #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
> >> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >> +#include <linux/bug.h>
> >>
> >> #include "workqueue_internal.h"
> >>
> >> @@ -2108,6 +2109,7 @@ __acquires(&pool->lock)
> >> current->comm, preempt_count(), task_pid_nr(current),
> >> worker->current_func);
> >> debug_show_held_locks(current);
> >> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
> >> dump_stack();
> >> }
> >>
> >> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
> >> index 2307d7c89dac..d64bd6b6fd45 100644
> >> --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
> >> +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
> >> @@ -1987,6 +1987,16 @@ config TEST_STATIC_KEYS
> >>
> >> If unsure, say N.
> >>
> >> +config BUG_ON_CORRUPTION
> >> + bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
> >> + help
> >> + Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
> >> + data corruption in various kernel memory structures during checks
> >> + added by options like CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST, CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK,
> >> + etc.
> >> +
> >> + If unsure, say N.
> >> +
> >> source "samples/Kconfig"
> >>
> >> source "lib/Kconfig.kgdb"
> >> diff --git a/lib/list_debug.c b/lib/list_debug.c
> >> index 80e2e40a6a4e..161c7e7d3478 100644
> >> --- a/lib/list_debug.c
> >> +++ b/lib/list_debug.c
> >> @@ -26,16 +26,19 @@ bool __list_add_debug(struct list_head *new,
> >> if (unlikely(next->prev != prev)) {
> >> WARN(1, "list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (%p), but was %p. (next=%p).\n",
> >> prev, next->prev, next);
> >> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
> >> return false;
> >> }
> >> if (unlikely(prev->next != next)) {
> >> WARN(1, "list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (%p), but was %p. (prev=%p).\n",
> >> next, prev->next, prev);
> >> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
> >> return false;
> >> }
> >> if (unlikely(new == prev || new == next)) {
> >> WARN(1, "list_add double add: new=%p, prev=%p, next=%p.\n",
> >> new, prev, next);
> >> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
> >> return false;
> >> }
> >> return true;
> >> @@ -52,21 +55,25 @@ bool __list_del_entry_debug(struct list_head *entry)
> >> if (unlikely(next == LIST_POISON1)) {
> >> WARN(1, "list_del corruption, %p->next is LIST_POISON1 (%p)\n",
> >> entry, LIST_POISON1);
> >> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
> >> return false;
> >> }
> >> if (unlikely(prev == LIST_POISON2)) {
> >> WARN(1, "list_del corruption, %p->prev is LIST_POISON2 (%p)\n",
> >> entry, LIST_POISON2);
> >> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
> >> return false;
> >> }
> >> if (unlikely(prev->next != entry)) {
> >> WARN(1, "list_del corruption. prev->next should be %p, but was %p\n",
> >> entry, prev->next);
> >> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
> >> return false;
> >> }
> >> if (unlikely(next->prev != entry)) {
> >> WARN(1, "list_del corruption. next->prev should be %p, but was %p\n",
> >> entry, next->prev);
> >> + BUG_ON(CORRUPTED_DATA_STRUCTURE);
> >> return false;
> >> }
> >> return true;
> >> --
> >> 2.7.4
> >>
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Nexus Security
>
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