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Message-Id: <20160818135444.683270625@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2016 15:54:37 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>
Subject: [PATCH 3.14 15/46] random: print a warning for the first ten uninitialized random users
3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
commit 9b4d008787f864f17d008c9c15bbe8a0f7e2fc24 upstream.
Since systemd is consistently using /dev/urandom before it is
initialized, we can't see the other potentially dangerous users of
/dev/urandom immediately after boot. So print the first ten such
complaints instead.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1339,12 +1339,16 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __us
static ssize_t
urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
+ static int maxwarn = 10;
int ret;
- if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0))
- printk_once(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s urandom read "
- "with %d bits of entropy available\n",
- current->comm, nonblocking_pool.entropy_total);
+ if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0) &&
+ maxwarn > 0) {
+ maxwarn--;
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized urandom read "
+ "(%zd bytes read, %d bits of entropy available)\n",
+ current->comm, nbytes, nonblocking_pool.entropy_total);
+ }
ret = extract_entropy_user(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
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