linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.12 061/100] sysv, ipc: fix security-layer leaking

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Fri, 19 Aug 2016 09:11:00 +0200
From:   Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To:     stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Fabian Frederick <fabf@...net.be>,
        Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@...e.de>,
        Manfred Spraul <manfred@...orfullife.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 3.12 061/100] sysv, ipc: fix security-layer leaking

From: Fabian Frederick <fabf@...net.be>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 9b24fef9f0410fb5364245d6cc2bd044cc064007 upstream.

Commit 53dad6d3a8e5 ("ipc: fix race with LSMs") updated ipc_rcu_putref()
to receive rcu freeing function but used generic ipc_rcu_free() instead
of msg_rcu_free() which does security cleaning.

Running LTP msgsnd06 with kmemleak gives the following:

  cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak

  unreferenced object 0xffff88003c0a11f8 (size 8):
    comm "msgsnd06", pid 1645, jiffies 4294672526 (age 6.549s)
    hex dump (first 8 bytes):
      1b 00 00 00 01 00 00 00                          ........
    backtrace:
      kmemleak_alloc+0x23/0x40
      kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe1/0x180
      selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security+0x3f/0xd0
      security_msg_queue_alloc+0x2e/0x40
      newque+0x4e/0x150
      ipcget+0x159/0x1b0
      SyS_msgget+0x39/0x40
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f

Manfred Spraul suggested to fix sem.c as well and Davidlohr Bueso to
only use ipc_rcu_free in case of security allocation failure in newary()

Fixes: 53dad6d3a8e ("ipc: fix race with LSMs")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470083552-22966-1-git-send-email-fabf@skynet.be
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@...net.be>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@...e.de>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@...orfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
---
 ipc/msg.c |  2 +-
 ipc/sem.c | 12 ++++++------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ipc/msg.c b/ipc/msg.c
index 32aaaab15c5c..f8c22afff450 100644
--- a/ipc/msg.c
+++ b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ long do_msgsnd(int msqid, long mtype, void __user *mtext,
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		ipc_lock_object(&msq->q_perm);
 
-		ipc_rcu_putref(msq, ipc_rcu_free);
+		ipc_rcu_putref(msq, msg_rcu_free);
 		if (msq->q_perm.deleted) {
 			err = -EIDRM;
 			goto out_unlock0;
diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
index b064468e876f..7fb486739cbb 100644
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static inline struct sem_array *sem_obtain_object_check(struct ipc_namespace *ns
 static inline void sem_lock_and_putref(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
 	sem_lock(sma, NULL, -1);
-	ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+	ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 }
 
 static inline void sem_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct sem_array *s)
@@ -1373,7 +1373,7 @@ static int semctl_main(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid, int semnum,
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			sem_io = ipc_alloc(sizeof(ushort)*nsems);
 			if(sem_io == NULL) {
-				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			}
 
@@ -1407,20 +1407,20 @@ static int semctl_main(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid, int semnum,
 		if(nsems > SEMMSL_FAST) {
 			sem_io = ipc_alloc(sizeof(ushort)*nsems);
 			if(sem_io == NULL) {
-				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			}
 		}
 
 		if (copy_from_user (sem_io, p, nsems*sizeof(ushort))) {
-			ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+			ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 			err = -EFAULT;
 			goto out_free;
 		}
 
 		for (i = 0; i < nsems; i++) {
 			if (sem_io[i] > SEMVMX) {
-				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+				ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 				err = -ERANGE;
 				goto out_free;
 			}
@@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ static struct sem_undo *find_alloc_undo(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid)
 	/* step 2: allocate new undo structure */
 	new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sem_undo) + sizeof(short)*nsems, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!new) {
-		ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free);
+		ipc_rcu_putref(sma, sem_rcu_free);
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 
-- 
2.9.3