linux-kernel - [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active

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Message-ID: <147190831414.9523.1885664762210149209.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>
Date:   Mon, 22 Aug 2016 19:25:14 -0400
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     <simon.guinot@...uanux.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
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Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV
 active

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>

When Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is active, BOOT data (such as
EFI related data) is encrypted and needs to be access as such. Update the
architecture override in early_memremap to keep the encryption attribute
when mapping this data.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index e3bdc5a..2ea6deb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -429,10 +429,11 @@ pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
 					     pgprot_t prot)
 {
 	/*
-	 * If memory encryption is enabled and BOOT_DATA is being mapped
-	 * then remove the encryption bit.
+	 * If memory encryption is enabled, we are not running with
+	 * SEV active and BOOT_DATA is being mapped then remove the
+	 * encryption bit
 	 */
-	if (_PAGE_ENC && (owner == BOOT_DATA))
+	if (_PAGE_ENC && !sev_active && (owner == BOOT_DATA))
 		prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) & ~_PAGE_ENC);
 
 	return prot;