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Message-ID: <20160822223529.29880.50884.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 17:35:29 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
<kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
<x86@...nel.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
<iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>
CC: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
This RFC patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Memory
Encryption (SME) feature.
SME can be used to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted through the
page tables. A page of memory that is marked encrypted will be automatically
decrypted when read from DRAM and will be automatically encrypted when
written to DRAM. Details on SME can found in the links below.
The SME feature is identified through a CPUID function and enabled through
the SYSCFG MSR. Once enabled, page table entries will determine how the
memory is accessed. If a page table entry has the memory encryption mask set,
then that memory will be accessed as encrypted memory. The memory encryption
mask (as well as other related information) is determined from settings
returned through the same CPUID function that identifies the presence of the
feature.
The approach that this patch series takes is to encrypt everything possible
starting early in the boot where the kernel is encrypted. Using the page
table macros the encryption mask can be incorporated into all page table
entries and page allocations. By updating the protection map, userspace
allocations are also marked encrypted. Certain data must be accounted for
as having been placed in memory before SME was enabled (EFI, initrd, etc.)
and accessed accordingly.
This patch series is a pre-cursor to another AMD processor feature called
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). The support for SEV will build upon
the SME support and will be submitted later. Details on SEV can be found
in the links below.
The following links provide additional detail:
AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper:
http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf
SME is section 7.10
SEV is section 15.34
This patch series is based off of the master branch of tip.
Commit 9fc6ddd95cbb ("Merge branch 'x86/platform'")
---
Sorry for the delay in getting v2 out.
Still to do: kexec support
Changes since v1:
- Added Documentation.
- Removed AMD vendor check for setting the PAT write protect mode
- Updated naming of trampoline flag for SME as well as moving of the
SME check to before paging is enabled.
- Change to early_memremap to identify the data being mapped as either
boot data or kernel data. The idea being that boot data will have
been placed in memory as un-encrypted data and would need to be accessed
as such.
- Updated debugfs support for the bootparams to access the data properly.
- Do not set the SYSCFG[MEME] bit, only check it. The setting of the
MemEncryptionModeEn bit results in a reduction of physical address size
of the processor. It is possible that BIOS could have configured resources
resources into a range that will now not be addressable. To prevent this,
rely on BIOS to set the SYSCFG[MEME] bit and only then enable memory
encryption support in the kernel.
Tom Lendacky (20):
x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement
x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature
x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME
x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs
x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory
x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible
mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
x86: DMA support for memory encryption
iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for memory encryption
x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs
x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping
x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables
x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 3
Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 35 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c | 2
arch/ia64/include/asm/early_ioremap.h | 2
arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/pagetable.c | 7 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 3
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 -
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 5
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3
arch/x86/include/asm/dma-mapping.h | 5
arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 16 +
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 91 +++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 26 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 49 +++-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 3
arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h | 12 +
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3
arch/x86/include/asm/vga.h | 13 +
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1
arch/x86/kernel/devicetree.c | 6
arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 2
arch/x86/kernel/espfix_64.c | 2
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 103 ++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 42 +++
arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c | 30 +-
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 2
arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S | 339 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/pci-dma.c | 11 +
arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c | 2
arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c | 8 -
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 17 +
arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c | 6
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 8 -
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 3
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 1
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 5
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 50 ++++
arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 4
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 203 ++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 78 ++++++
arch/x86/mm/pat.c | 4
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 15 +
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 13 +
arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 4
arch/x86/realmode/init.c | 13 +
arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 19 ++
arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 9 -
arch/x86/xen/setup.c | 6
drivers/acpi/tables.c | 2
drivers/firmware/efi/arm-init.c | 13 +
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 7 -
drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c | 4
drivers/firmware/efi/fake_mem.c | 3
drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c | 2
drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 10 +
include/asm-generic/early_ioremap.h | 17 +
include/linux/swiotlb.h | 1
init/main.c | 13 +
lib/swiotlb.c | 64 ++++-
mm/early_ioremap.c | 51 +++-
67 files changed, 1351 insertions(+), 150 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/mem_encrypt.S
create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
--
Tom Lendacky
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