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Date:   Thu, 25 Aug 2016 04:05:49 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:     Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc:     "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
        David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the
> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security
> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called
> Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to create
> powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the
> OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impact of
> bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications.
>

Maybe I'm missing an obvious description, but: do you have a
description of the eBPF API to landlock?  What function do you
provide, when is it called, what functions can it call, what does the
fancy new arraymap do, etc?

--Andy

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