linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 3/6] x86/dumpstack: make printk_stack

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Message-ID: <CA+55aFw4hfHMNn_vPGwKjUafV42C+H5ba4S29iJvk225etZ1pg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 25 Aug 2016 21:40:12 -0700
From:   Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To:     Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc:     Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@...il.com>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@....com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/6] x86/dumpstack: make printk_stack_address() more
 generally useful

On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 8:19 PM, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com> wrote:
> For an oops, there are other opportunities for address leakage besides
> the stack trace function addresses.  There's the raw stack dump which
> dumps the first 12 stack entries.  And there's the register dump.  I'm
> pretty sure we don't want to get rid of those.

We actually probably *do* want to get rid of the stack dump. It's
likely not really useful any more, and more legacy noise.

The register contents we definitely don't want to remove, obviously.
But apart from EIP itself (and LR etc on other architectures), those
actually rather seldom contain code addresses, so that kind of data is
rather harder to misuse.

That said, if you can trigger an oops, you do quite likely have a
security problem already.

So oopses aren't necessarily the first thing to worry about. I'd worry
more about things like WARN_ON_ONCE() that are much more likely things
that might be triggerable (ie we do occasionally have things like
warning for legacy system calls that shouldn't be used any more)

> I suppose we could come up with some innovative way to filter or
> sanitize kernel addresses from the stack dump and the registers.  But
> that probably hurts usability for kernel developers.

Yeah, but see above: an oops really does tend to often be a security
issue on its own, especially if it can be triggered arbitrarily by an
attacker.

> Another issue is that there are a lot of duplicate symbol names in the
> kernel.  So the symbol name alone might not be enough to disambiguate
> the function address.

That is true. It's seldom a big issue, though. Nobody actually uses
the address for anything _anyway_, so people end up disambiguating
those things based on context regardless.

Again, something like addr2line could be an exception, but (a) that
thing is useless in most situations due to randomization and (b) if
you don't randomize then the whole discussion is moot.

Plus add2line could just show all options, and then you end up doing
human disambiguation anyway.

> Not to mention the fact that today there are a gazillion uses of
> printk() with '%p' in the kernel.

Yes. And some of them have been stupiud security issues on their own,
and have nothing to do with symbol names. See for example commit
31b0b385f69d ("nf_conntrack: avoid kernel pointer value leak in slab
name")

> So yes, dmesg_restrict sounds useful to me.  It's a way to prevent users
> from seeing kernel addresses without affecting my ability to debug
> issues.  For a locked down system, why would non-root users need to
> access dmesg anyway?

That's the point. It is only useful for locked-down systems.

But that also means that IT IS NOT USEFUL AS A SECURITY ARGUMENT -
since it's simply not relevant to most systems out there.

Most systems aren't locked down.

> How exactly does removing data from the stack dump make it more useful?

I actually spend time cleaning up commit messages in logs, because
useless data that isn't actually information (random hex numbers) is
actively detrimental.

It makes commit logs less legible.

It also makes it harder to parse dumps.

It's not useful. That makes it actively bad.

I probably look at more oops reports than most people. I have not
found the hex numbers useful for the last five years, because they are
just randomized crap.

The stack content thing just makes code scroll off the screen etc, for example.

So in order for data to be useful, it has to be more than "data". It
has to be "information". More random useless hex noise is not good.

                   Linus