[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20160829190803.clqnlfl7qpi7tgsi@thunk.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2016 15:08:03 -0400
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
To: Chao Yu <chao@...nel.org>
Cc: jaegeuk@...nel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Chao Yu <yuchao0@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH] fscrypto: fix to null-terminate encrypted
filename in fname_encrypt
On Mon, Aug 29, 2016 at 10:55:47PM +0800, Chao Yu wrote:
> Hi Ted, Jaegeuk,
>
> Since encryption functionality in ext4/f2fs was exported to vfs as fscrypot
> module, more filesystems can use it, I'm not sure, maybe other fs will traverse
> encrypted filename directly.
>
> So, could we set this null character in fname_encrypt in advance in order to
> avoid hitting random characters behind target filename when traversing it?
The encrypted filename is only used by the file system; it's not
anything which is visible outside of the file system --- if it does,
such as passing it to the security subsystem, it's a bug.
Secondly, remember that the encrypted filename is a binary blob, and
may contain hex 00 as part of the encrypted filename. So ***any***
code that tries to use NULL termination for the encrypted filename by
definition is a bug. In other words, you must use memcpy, and not
strcpy. If you use strcpy, even if you did add a NUL character to the
end of the encrypted filename (which is a bit of a misnomer because it
is a binary blob, not an ASCII string, so NUL is really not
technically correct), there will be encrypted filenames where strcpy
will stop early, because there is a 0x00 byte in the encrypted
filename.
Hence, other file systems MUST NOT traverse the encrypted filename
directly, because treating it as a NUL-terminated string when it is
really a binary blob of bits that can include a 0x00 byte is by
definition a BUG.
Cheers,
- Ted
Powered by blists - more mailing lists