Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLfvx0w+uVbrcVky7hS-6VsSRStOjEyCt6TUqgA7s6OVg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 6 Sep 2016 13:56:40 -0400
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>
Cc:     Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
        lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
        KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@...fujitsu.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs/proc/kcore.c: Omit kernel text area for hardened
 usercopy feature

On Mon, Sep 5, 2016 at 4:47 AM, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 08:17:13AM -0700, Andi Kleen wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 02:25:45PM +0200, Jiri Olsa wrote:
>> > One of the bullets for hardened usercopy feature is:
>> >   - object must not overlap with kernel text
>> >
>> > which is what we expose via /proc/kcore. We can hit
>> > this check and crash the system very easily just by
>> > reading the text area in kcore file:
>> >
>> >   usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffffffff8179a01f (<kernel text>) (4065 bytes)
>> >   kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75!

It looks like it was this one in kcore.c:

                } else {
                        if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
                                unsigned long n;

                                n = copy_to_user(buffer, (char *)start, tsz);

>> > Omitting kernel text area from kcore when there's
>> > hardened usercopy feature is enabled.
>>
>> That will completely break PT decoding, which relies on looking
>> at the kernel text in /proc/kcore.
>>
>> Need a different fix here, perhaps some special copy function
>> that is not hardened.
>
> how about something like this
>
> jirka
>
>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index c3f291195294..43f5404f0e61 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -726,7 +726,8 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
>  }
>
>  static inline unsigned long __must_check
> -copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> +copy_to_user_check(void __user *to, const void *from,
> +                  unsigned long n, bool check)
>  {
>         int sz = __compiletime_object_size(from);
>
> @@ -735,7 +736,8 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
>         might_fault();
>
>         if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) {
> -               check_object_size(from, n, true);
> +               if (check)
> +                       check_object_size(from, n, true);
>                 n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n);
>         } else if (!__builtin_constant_p(n))
>                 copy_user_overflow(sz, n);
> @@ -745,6 +747,19 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
>         return n;
>  }
>
> +static inline unsigned long __must_check
> +copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> +{
> +       return copy_to_user_check(to, from, n, true);
> +}
> +
> +static inline unsigned long __must_check
> +copy_to_user_nocheck(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> +{
> +       return copy_to_user_check(to, from, n, false);
> +}
> +
> +
>  /*
>   * We rely on the nested NMI work to allow atomic faults from the NMI path; the
>   * nested NMI paths are careful to preserve CR2.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
> index 673059a109fe..e80e4a146b7d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
> @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ __must_check unsigned long
>  copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned len);
>
>  static __always_inline __must_check
> -int __copy_from_user_nocheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
> +int __copy_from_user_nofaultcheck(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
>  {
>         int ret = 0;
>
> @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int __copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
>  {
>         might_fault();
>         kasan_check_write(dst, size);
> -       return __copy_from_user_nocheck(dst, src, size);
> +       return __copy_from_user_nofaultcheck(dst, src, size);
>  }
>
>  static __always_inline __must_check
> @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static __must_check __always_inline int
>  __copy_from_user_inatomic(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
>  {
>         kasan_check_write(dst, size);
> -       return __copy_from_user_nocheck(dst, src, size);
> +       return __copy_from_user_nofaultcheck(dst, src, size);
>  }
>
>  static __must_check __always_inline int
> diff --git a/fs/proc/kcore.c b/fs/proc/kcore.c
> index a939f5ed7f89..c7a22a8a157e 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/kcore.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/kcore.c
> @@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
>                         if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
>                                 unsigned long n;
>
> -                               n = copy_to_user(buffer, (char *)start, tsz);
> +                               n = copy_to_user_nocheck(buffer, (char *)start, tsz);
>                                 /*
>                                  * We cannot distinguish between fault on source
>                                  * and fault on destination. When this happens

This patch is x86-specific (but ARCH_PROC_KCORE_TEXT is on multiple
architectures), which I don't think we want. Instead, let's get the
usercopy helper code centralized (Al Viro is looking at this already),
and then we can design arch-agnostic methods to handle this.

In the meantime, how about continuing to use a bounce buffer like
already done in the vmalloc_or_module_addr() case immediately above?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Nexus Security

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