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Message-ID: <e30ddb53-df6c-28ee-54fe-f3e52e515acb@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 09:20:44 -0500
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Matt Fleming <mfleming@...e.de>
CC: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
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Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
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Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
<iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
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Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
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Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
On 09/12/2016 11:55 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Aug 22, 2016 6:53 PM, "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@....com> wrote:
>>
>> BOOT data (such as EFI related data) is not encyrpted when the system is
>> booted and needs to be accessed as non-encrypted. Add support to the
>> early_memremap API to identify the type of data being accessed so that
>> the proper encryption attribute can be applied. Currently, two types
>> of data are defined, KERNEL_DATA and BOOT_DATA.
>
> What happens when you memremap boot services data outside of early
> boot? Matt just added code that does this.
>
> IMO this API is not so great. It scatters a specialized consideration
> all over the place. Could early_memremap not look up the PA to figure
> out what to do?
Yes, I could see if the PA falls outside of the kernel usable area and,
if so, remove the memory encryption attribute from the mapping (for both
early_memremap and memremap).
Let me look into that, I would prefer something along that line over
this change.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> --Andy
>
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