linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted

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Date:   Wed, 14 Sep 2016 16:51:01 +0200
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc:     linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs
 un-encrypted

On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 09:29:41AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> This is still required because just using the __va() would still cause
> the mapping created to have the encryption bit set. The ioremap call
> will result in the mapping not having the encryption bit set.

I meant this: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160902181447.GA25328@nazgul.tnic

Wouldn't simply clearing the SME mask work?

#define __va(x)			((void *)(((unsigned long)(x)+PAGE_OFFSET) & ~sme_me_mask))

Or are you saying, one needs the whole noodling through ioremap_cache()
because the data is already encrypted and accessing it with sme_me_mask
cleared would simply give you the encrypted garbage?

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.
--