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Message-ID: <20160916074730.GJ5012@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2016 09:47:30 +0200
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jann@...jh.net>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, live-patching@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/12] x86/dumpstack: Pin the target stack in
save_stack_trace_tsk()
On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 02:19:38PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 11:41:25AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > I also wouldn't mind trying to do something to prevent ever dumping
> > the stack of an actively running task. It's definitely safe to dump:
> >
> > - current
> >
> > - any task that's stopped via ptrace, etc
> >
> > - any task on the current CPU if running atomically enough that the
> > task can't migrate (which probably covers the nasty NMI cases, I hope)
> >
> > What's *not* safe AFAIK is /proc/PID/stack. I don't know if we can
> > somehow fix that short of actually sending an interrupt or NMI to
> > freeze the task if it's running. I'm also not sure it's worth
> > worrying about it.
>
> Yeah, I proposed a fix for /proc/PID/stack a while back:
>
> https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1424109806.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
>
> My idea was to use task_rq_lock() to lock the runqueue and then check
> tsk->on_cpu. I think Peter wasn't too keen on it.
That basically allows a DoS on the scheduler, since a user can run tasks
on every cpu (through sys_sched_setaffinity()). Then doing while (1) cat
/proc/$PID/stack would saturate the rq->lock on every CPU.
The more tasks the merrier.
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