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Message-Id: <1474386996-16049-1-git-send-email-labbott@redhat.com>
Date:   Tue, 20 Sep 2016 08:56:36 -0700
From:   Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH] mm: usercopy: Check for module addresses

While running a compile on arm64, I hit a memory exposure

usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from fffffc0000f3b1a8 (buffer_head) (1 bytes)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:75!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT
nf_reject_ipv6 xt_conntrack ip_set nfnetlink ebtable_broute bridge stp
llc ebtable_nat ip6table_security ip6table_raw ip6table_nat
nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_nat_ipv6 ip6table_mangle
iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4
nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack iptable_mangle
ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables vfat fat xgene_edac
xgene_enet edac_core i2c_xgene_slimpro i2c_core at803x realtek xgene_dma
mdio_xgene gpio_dwapb gpio_xgene_sb xgene_rng mailbox_xgene_slimpro nfsd
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc xfs libcrc32c sdhci_of_arasan
sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core xhci_plat_hcd gpio_keys
CPU: 0 PID: 19744 Comm: updatedb Tainted: G        W 4.8.0-rc3-threadinfo+ #1
Hardware name: AppliedMicro X-Gene Mustang Board/X-Gene Mustang Board, BIOS 3.06.12 Aug 12 2016
task: fffffe03df944c00 task.stack: fffffe00d128c000
PC is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
LR is at __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
...
[<fffffc00082b4280>] __check_object_size+0x70/0x3f0
[<fffffc00082cdc30>] filldir64+0x158/0x1a0
[<fffffc0000f327e8>] __fat_readdir+0x4a0/0x558 [fat]
[<fffffc0000f328d4>] fat_readdir+0x34/0x40 [fat]
[<fffffc00082cd8f8>] iterate_dir+0x190/0x1e0
[<fffffc00082cde58>] SyS_getdents64+0x88/0x120
[<fffffc0008082c70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28

fffffc0000f3b1a8 is a module address. Modules may have compiled in
strings which could get copied to userspace. In this instance, it
looks like "." which matches with a size of 1 byte. Extend the
is_vmalloc_addr check to be is_vmalloc_or_module_addr to cover
all possible cases.

Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
---
Longer term, it would be good to expand the check for to regions like
regular kernel memory.
---
 mm/usercopy.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c
index 8ebae91..d8b5bd3 100644
--- a/mm/usercopy.c
+++ b/mm/usercopy.c
@@ -145,8 +145,11 @@ static inline const char *check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
 	 * Some architectures (arm64) return true for virt_addr_valid() on
 	 * vmalloced addresses. Work around this by checking for vmalloc
 	 * first.
+	 *
+	 * We also need to check for module addresses explicitly since we
+	 * may copy static data from modules to userspace
 	 */
-	if (is_vmalloc_addr(ptr))
+	if (is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(ptr))
 		return NULL;
 
 	if (!virt_addr_valid(ptr))
-- 
2.7.4

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