linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init

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Date:   Wed, 21 Sep 2016 11:40:54 +0200
From:   Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init

On 09/14/2016, 06:17 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> Correct, this is a continuing effort to reduce the internal attack
> surface of the kernel, where one of the most common exploitation
> methods is overwriting function pointers.
> 
> Some examples of attacks and mitigations are here:
> http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Exploit_Methods/Function_pointer_overwrite
> 
> While this patch isn't a huge change, it's still a viable candidate. I
> send these as I notice them, and hope that other folks will start to
> see these opportunities and send more patches too. :)

I didn't object to the patch. I could imagine the use case. But putting
the idea to the commit message would have made it clear.

thanks,
-- 
js
suse labs