linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active

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Message-ID: <4e93fbb3-d01c-1fd6-0610-56402eb5c242@redhat.com>
Date:   Thu, 22 Sep 2016 20:50:42 +0200
From:   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc:     simon.guinot@...uanux.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, rkrcmar@...hat.com, matt@...eblueprint.co.uk,
        linus.walleij@...aro.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        paul.gortmaker@...driver.com, hpa@...or.com,
        dan.j.williams@...el.com, aarcange@...hat.com,
        sfr@...b.auug.org.au, andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com,
        herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, bhe@...hat.com, xemul@...allels.com,
        joro@...tes.org, x86@...nel.org, mingo@...hat.com,
        msalter@...hat.com, ross.zwisler@...ux.intel.com,
        dyoung@...hat.com, jroedel@...e.de, keescook@...omium.org,
        toshi.kani@....com, mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com,
        devel@...uxdriverproject.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
        mchehab@...nel.org, iamjoonsoo.kim@....com,
        labbott@...oraproject.org, tony.luck@...el.com,
        alexandre.bounine@....com, kuleshovmail@...il.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mcgrof@...nel.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        davem@...emloft.net
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when
 SEV is active



On 22/09/2016 20:47, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> > Because the firmware volume is written to high memory in encrypted form,
> > and because the PEI phase runs in 32-bit mode, the firmware code will be
> > encrypted; on the other hand, data that is placed in low memory for the
> > kernel can be unencrypted, thus limiting differences between SME and SEV.
> 
> I like the idea of limiting the differences but it would leave the EFI
> data and ACPI tables exposed and able to be manipulated.

Hmm, that makes sense.  So I guess this has to stay, and Borislav's
proposal doesn't fly either.

Paolo