linux-kernel - Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

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Message-ID: <20160924074525.GA28371@amd>
Date:   Sat, 24 Sep 2016 09:45:25 +0200
From:   Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:     Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
        David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

On Tue 2016-09-20 19:08:23, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> 
> On 15/09/2016 11:19, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > Hi!
> > 
> >> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the
> >> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security
> >> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called
> >> Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to create
> >> powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the
> >> OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impact of
> >> bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications.
> >>
> >> The first RFC [1] was focused on extending seccomp while staying at the syscall
> >> level. This brought a working PoC but with some (mitigated) ToCToU race
> >> conditions due to the seccomp ptrace hole (now fixed) and the non-atomic
> >> syscall argument evaluation (hence the LSM hooks).
> > 
> > Long and nice description follows. Should it go to Documentation/
> > somewhere?
> > 
> > Because some documentation would be useful...
> 
> Right, but I was looking for feedback before investing in documentation. :)

Heh. And I was hoping to learn what I'm reviewing. Too bad :-).

								Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

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