linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.12 113/119] openrisc: fix copy_from

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Message-Id: <0ab16ba1cdfed30d4b96f723fad6aa1342fa6513.1475144721.git.jslaby@suse.cz>
Date:   Thu, 29 Sep 2016 12:25:49 +0200
From:   Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To:     stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 3.12 113/119] openrisc: fix copy_from_user()

From: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit acb2505d0119033a80c85ac8d02dccae41271667 upstream.

... that should zero on faults.  Also remove the <censored> helpful
logics wrt range truncation copied from ppc32.  Where it had ever
been needed only in case of copy_from_user() *and* had not been merged
into the mainline until a month after the need had disappeared.
A decade before openrisc went into mainline, I might add...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
---
 arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 35 +++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ab2e7a198a4c..908c0904bdd6 100644
--- a/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/openrisc/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -273,28 +273,20 @@ __copy_tofrom_user(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long size);
 static inline unsigned long
 copy_from_user(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
-	unsigned long over;
-
-	if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
-		return __copy_tofrom_user(to, from, n);
-	if ((unsigned long)from < TASK_SIZE) {
-		over = (unsigned long)from + n - TASK_SIZE;
-		return __copy_tofrom_user(to, from, n - over) + over;
-	}
-	return n;
+	unsigned long res = n;
+
+	if (likely(access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n)))
+		n = __copy_tofrom_user(to, from, n);
+	if (unlikely(res))
+		memset(to + (n - res), 0, res);
+	return res;
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long
 copy_to_user(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
-	unsigned long over;
-
-	if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
-		return __copy_tofrom_user(to, from, n);
-	if ((unsigned long)to < TASK_SIZE) {
-		over = (unsigned long)to + n - TASK_SIZE;
-		return __copy_tofrom_user(to, from, n - over) + over;
-	}
+	if (likely(access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)))
+		n = __copy_tofrom_user(to, from, n);
 	return n;
 }
 
@@ -303,13 +295,8 @@ extern unsigned long __clear_user(void *addr, unsigned long size);
 static inline __must_check unsigned long
 clear_user(void *addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-
-	if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, size))
-		return __clear_user(addr, size);
-	if ((unsigned long)addr < TASK_SIZE) {
-		unsigned long over = (unsigned long)addr + size - TASK_SIZE;
-		return __clear_user(addr, size - over) + over;
-	}
+	if (likely(access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, size)))
+		size = __clear_user(addr, size);
 	return size;
 }
 
-- 
2.10.0