linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.12 064/119] ALSA: timer: fix NULL pointer dereference in read()/ioctl() race

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Message-Id: <d244fbcc5ea46592d4f409c0418e8fe0be3d81ca.1475144721.git.jslaby@suse.cz>
Date:   Thu, 29 Sep 2016 12:25:00 +0200
From:   Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
To:     stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>,
        Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Subject: [PATCH 3.12 064/119] ALSA: timer: fix NULL pointer dereference in read()/ioctl() race

From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit 11749e086b2766cccf6217a527ef5c5604ba069c upstream.

I got this with syzkaller:

    ==================================================================
    BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref on address 0000000000000020
    Read of size 32 by task syz-executor/22519
    CPU: 1 PID: 22519 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ #169
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2
    014
     0000000000000001 ffff880111a17a00 ffffffff81f9f141 ffff880111a17a90
     ffff880111a17c50 ffff880114584a58 ffff880114584a10 ffff880111a17a80
     ffffffff8161fe3f ffff880100000000 ffff880118d74a48 ffff880118d74a68
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff81f9f141>] dump_stack+0x83/0xb2
     [<ffffffff8161fe3f>] kasan_report_error+0x41f/0x4c0
     [<ffffffff8161ff74>] kasan_report+0x34/0x40
     [<ffffffff82c84b54>] ? snd_timer_user_read+0x554/0x790
     [<ffffffff8161e79e>] check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1a0
     [<ffffffff8161e9c1>] kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
     [<ffffffff82c84b54>] snd_timer_user_read+0x554/0x790
     [<ffffffff82c84600>] ? snd_timer_user_info_compat.isra.5+0x2b0/0x2b0
     [<ffffffff817d0831>] ? proc_fault_inject_write+0x1c1/0x250
     [<ffffffff817d0670>] ? next_tgid+0x2a0/0x2a0
     [<ffffffff8127c278>] ? do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
     [<ffffffff8174653a>] ? fsnotify+0x72a/0xca0
     [<ffffffff81674dfe>] __vfs_read+0x10e/0x550
     [<ffffffff82c84600>] ? snd_timer_user_info_compat.isra.5+0x2b0/0x2b0
     [<ffffffff81674cf0>] ? do_sendfile+0xc50/0xc50
     [<ffffffff81745e10>] ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x60/0x60
     [<ffffffff8143fec6>] ? kcov_ioctl+0x56/0x190
     [<ffffffff81e5ada2>] ? common_file_perm+0x2e2/0x380
     [<ffffffff81746b0e>] ? __fsnotify_parent+0x5e/0x2b0
     [<ffffffff81d93536>] ? security_file_permission+0x86/0x1e0
     [<ffffffff816728f5>] ? rw_verify_area+0xe5/0x2b0
     [<ffffffff81675355>] vfs_read+0x115/0x330
     [<ffffffff81676371>] SyS_read+0xd1/0x1a0
     [<ffffffff816762a0>] ? vfs_write+0x4b0/0x4b0
     [<ffffffff82001c2c>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x1c/0x20
     [<ffffffff8150455a>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x3a/0x1e0
     [<ffffffff816762a0>] ? vfs_write+0x4b0/0x4b0
     [<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0
     [<ffffffff810052fc>] ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x16c/0x1d0
     [<ffffffff83c3276a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    ==================================================================

There are a couple of problems that I can see:

 - ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT), which potentially sets
   tu->queue/tu->tqueue to NULL on memory allocation failure, so read()
   would get a NULL pointer dereference like the above splat

 - the same ioctl() can free tu->queue/to->tqueue which means read()
   could potentially see (and dereference) the freed pointer

We can fix both by taking the ioctl_lock mutex when dereferencing
->queue/->tqueue, since that's always held over all the ioctl() code.

Just looking at the code I find it likely that there are more problems
here such as tu->qhead pointing outside the buffer if the size is
changed concurrently using SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS.

[js] unlock in fail paths

Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@...e.de>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
---
 sound/core/timer.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c
index 1902ec0d4487..5e7c62ae6a3d 100644
--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -1932,19 +1932,23 @@ static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto _error;
 
+		mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
 		if (tu->tread) {
 			if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[tu->qhead++],
 					 sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread))) {
+				mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
 				err = -EFAULT;
 				goto _error;
 			}
 		} else {
 			if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[tu->qhead++],
 					 sizeof(struct snd_timer_read))) {
+				mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
 				err = -EFAULT;
 				goto _error;
 			}
 		}
+		mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
 
 		tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
 
-- 
2.10.0