linux-kernel - Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

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Message-ID: <57F562CA.7080300@digikod.net>
Date:   Wed, 5 Oct 2016 22:30:02 +0200
From:   Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>,
        David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing


On 04/10/2016 00:56, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 10:08 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>
>> On 15/09/2016 11:19, Pavel Machek wrote:
>>> Hi!
>>>
>>>> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the
>>>> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security
>>>> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called
>>>> Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to create
>>>> powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the
>>>> OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impact of
>>>> bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications.
>>>>
>>>> The first RFC [1] was focused on extending seccomp while staying at the syscall
>>>> level. This brought a working PoC but with some (mitigated) ToCToU race
>>>> conditions due to the seccomp ptrace hole (now fixed) and the non-atomic
>>>> syscall argument evaluation (hence the LSM hooks).
>>>
>>> Long and nice description follows. Should it go to Documentation/
>>> somewhere?
>>>
>>> Because some documentation would be useful...
>>>                                                               Pavel
>>
>> Right, but I was looking for feedback before investing in documentation. :)
> 
> Heh, understood. There are a number of grammar issues that slow me
> down when reading this, so when it does move into Documentation/, I'll
> have some English nit-picks. :)
> 
> While reading I found myself wanting an explicit list of "guiding
> principles" for anyone implementing new hooks. It is touched on in
> several places (don't expose things, don't allow for privilege
> changes, etc). Having that spelled out somewhere would be nice.

Right, I'm going to try to create a more consistent documentation with
the "guiding principles".

 Mickaël



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