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Message-ID: <1722218.eZlGktOxfL@tauon.atsec.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 16:24:22 +0200
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@...il.com>
Cc: herbert@...dor.apana.org.au, davem@...emloft.net,
maxime.ripard@...e-electrons.com, wens@...e.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: sun4i-ss: support the Security System PRNG
Am Dienstag, 18. Oktober 2016, 14:34:27 CEST schrieb Corentin Labbe:
Hi Corentin,
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-hwrng.c
> b/drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-hwrng.c new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..95fadb7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-hwrng.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
> +#include "sun4i-ss.h"
> +
> +static int sun4i_ss_hwrng_init(struct hwrng *hwrng)
> +{
> + struct sun4i_ss_ctx *ss;
> +
> + ss = container_of(hwrng, struct sun4i_ss_ctx, hwrng);
> + get_random_bytes(ss->seed, SS_SEED_LEN);
Is it wise to call get_random_bytes once in the init function and never
thereafter?
This init function may be called during boot time of the kernel at which the
input_pool may not yet have received sufficient amounts of entropy.
What about registering a callback with add_random_ready_callback and seed
again when sufficient entropy was collected?
Ciao
Stephan
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