linux-kernel - Re: [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace_may

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 18 Oct 2016 20:06:24 +0200
From:   Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>
To:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:     Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix
 ptrace_may_access

On Tue 18-10-16 09:56:53, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org> writes:
> 
> > On Mon 17-10-16 11:39:49, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> 
> >> During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is
> >> not readable by the user executing the file.  A bug in
> >> ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to
> >> enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER),
> >> unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER).
> >> 
> >> This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding
> >> a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec,
> >> so it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present
> >> in to be able to safely give read permission to the executable.
> >> 
> >> The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer
> >> has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns.
> >> This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate
> >> user namespace it does not become ptraceable.
> >
> > I haven't studied your patch too deeply but one thing that immediately 
> > raised a red flag was that mm might be shared between processes (aka
> > thread groups). What prevents those two to sit in different user
> > namespaces?
> >
> > I am primarily asking because this generated a lot of headache for the
> > memcg handling as those processes might sit in different cgroups while
> > there is only one correct memcg for them which can disagree with the
> > cgroup associated with one of the processes.
> 
> That is a legitimate concern, but I do not see any of those kinds of
> issues here.
> 
> Part of the memcg pain comes from the fact that control groups are
> process centric, and part of the pain comes from the fact that it is
> possible to change control groups.  What I am doing is making the mm
> owned by a user namespace (at creation time), and I am not allowing
> changes to that ownership. The credentials of the tasks that use that mm
> may be in the same user namespace or descendent user namespaces.

OK, then my worries about this weird "threading" model is void.

Thanks for the clarification.
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs